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I. INTRODUCTION
Cases involving international crimes are not easy to demarcate.
International crimes generally occur on a massive scale over a prolonged
period of time involving many different perpetrators at various levels of
command and resulting in copious amounts of victims. Who did what to
whom, when, and where exactly? The degree of specificity to which these
elements ought to be defined is not as easy to determine as one might
think, and with international crimes lack of specificity seeps in at every
level. Temporal, geographical, and personal (meaning the identity and
amount of both perpetrators and victims) demarcation of the case present
ample challenges. It has done so ever since the first international criminal
* Lecturer & Ph.D. Researcher, VU University Amsterdam. The author wishes to thank Elies
van Sliedregt, G6ran Sluiter, Sergey Vasiliev, and Barbora Hola for their invaluable comments
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prosecutions. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt from the
Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General dated January 22,
1945 the difficulties of prosecutions of large-scale crimes were
forewarned as follows:
The names of the chief German leaders are well known, and the
proof of their guilt will not offer great difficulties. However, the
crimes to be punished have been committed upon such a large scale
that the problem of identification, trial and punishment of their
perpetrators presents a situation without parallel in the
administration of criminal justice. In thousands of cases, it will be
impossible to establish the offender's identity or to connect him
with the particular act charged.1
While modern day international criminal tribunals have come a long
way in dealing with these challenges, vague indictments-the main
document that contains the nature (legal characterization) and the cause
(underlying facts) of the charges-remain an issue until this day. This is
for two reasons. First, unspecific charges stem from difficulties with, for
instance, pinpointing the exact day a crime took place, in which village it
happened, or which (physical) perpetrators were involved. These are
factual problems of specificity, usually reflected by vaguely-worded
indictments with phrases such as 'on or about' to indicate when
something happened or with references to entire provinces instead of
towns or villages to indicate where something happened. Second, vague
charges are caused by more abstract evidentiary matters, such as unclear
distinctions between material facts-meaning those encompassed in the
charges and subject to proof-and subsidiary facts-meaning those that
serve as indirect proof or background information without needing to be
judicially established. Questions may arise as to which facts should be
part of the indictment, and how different types of facts relate to the
evidence supporting the charges. This unclear distinction caused
problems in Gbagbo at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Pre-
Trial Chamber (PTC) adjourned the hearing on the confirmation of
charges and requested the Prosecution to gather more evidence relating
to a number of incidents allegedly constituting the "attack" as element of
the charged crime against humanity, deeming those incidents material
facts, but which incidents the Prosecution itself had not regarded as being
part of the material facts charged. Rather, it had intended to use those
incidents as subsidiary facts to demonstrate a certain pattern.2 Such
1. Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of State and War and the
Attorney General, International Conference on Military Trials: London, 1945 (Jan. 22, 1945), §
IV, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jackO.asp.
2. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11-432, Decision adjourning
[Vol. 27
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confusion of material and subsidiary facts is not only time-consuming to
rectify; litigation on this matter went on for almost a year-it also leaves
the defense in the dark with respect to the indictment's factual
parameters.
Case demarcation solidifies with the charging document or
indictment, which then puts the accused on notice as to the case against
him or her. Allowing the defense to know the case against him or her is
crucial from a fair trial perspective, and the indictment is the core
document on which that knowledge depends. This right and the
indictment are therefore at the heart of the demarcation dilemmas
discussed in this Article. The indictment should not be confused, though,
with other official documents such as the arrest warrant, issued by a
judicial organ and intended to secure an accused's presence at trial, or to
prevent a suspect from obstructing the investigation or committing
further crimes, nor with pre-trial briefs, issued by the prosecution or the
defense after the indictment has been filed and setting out how that party
intends to argue its case.
4
The indictment's effect of providing notice to the accused
demonstrates the unique and fundamental dual purpose of the accusatory
instrument: (1) to inform the accused about the charge(s), and (2) to settle
the factual scope of the trial. While both aspects are imperative to an
effective defense, there are two interests at stake here that seem to pull in
opposite directions. On the one hand, the principle of the specificity of
charges ensures the right of the defense to be informed promptly and in
detail of the nature, cause, and content of the charge as well as the ability
to mount his or her defense. On the other hand, prosecutors are faced with
considerable challenges of case demarcation caused by international
crimes' largely vague factual parameters. In international criminal
justice, it is difficult to find definitive answers to the five W's (who, what,
the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute,
36, 44 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl599831.pdf [hereinafter Gbagbo
Adjournment Decision]; Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11-474,
Prosecution's appeal against the "Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges
pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute," 3, 23, 26, 29 (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1631903.pdf [hereinafter Gbagbo Prosecution's Appeal].
3. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 58(1)(b), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 19(2), 20(2), adopted
May 25, 1993, as amended by S.C. Res. 1877, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
4. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 rule 65 ter (E) & (F), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 49 (May 22, 2013) [hereinafter ICTY RPE].
5. See H~kan Friman et al., Charges, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES
AND RULES 381, 383 (G6ran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013).
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when, where and why?), intended as formula for ascertaining the
complete story on any given topic, due to the massive scale of the events,
the array of actors involved, the difficult access to direct or high-quality
evidence, and investigations taking place long after the events. While the
accused's interests are of paramount importance in light of due process
protection and the legitimacy of the court and its proceedings in general,
the prosecution's task to state a case must remain a realistic endeavor.
This Article seeks to ascertain the following: how specific should the
charges in an international crimes case be, which circumstances play a
role in answering this question, and what influences specificity, or the
lack thereof? The focus is therefore on case demarcation in light of an
investigation or case against an identified suspect or accused and centers
on the indictment phase of criminal proceedings. It does not include
investigation demarcation in the sense of prosecutorial discretion
regarding determining who to investigate or indict. Case demarcation can
only take form and be examined fruitfully once a suspect or accused has
been identified. Investigations of a preliminary nature into situations of
mass atrocity, which face prosecutors with complex questions of which
potentially responsible persons to focus investigative and prosecutorial
efforts on lie outside the ambit of this Article. The law and practice of
amending charges is also excluded. Although related, it is beyond this
Article's query, because it does not pertain to factual and evidentiary case
demarcation in the strictest sense, as it should take form at the indictment
stage. Rather, it relates to subsequent procedural matters of shifting
boundaries, not placing them.
Part II starts with reviewing the issue of vague indictments as dealt
with by the historical Nuremberg, Tokyo, and Control Council Law No.
10 trials, as well as case law from the modem day U.N. tribunals and the
ICC regarding ambiguous charges and general pleading principles. This
is the first type of case demarcation, which focuses on factual specificity.
Part III deals with the second type of case demarcation, which may be
regarded as legal demarcation of evidentiary matters, and that has never
before been examined in international criminal justice scholarship. It
deals with various types of facts and evidence and the importance of
distinguishing them, and explores the differences between material facts
and subsidiary facts, pattern evidence and evidence of similar conduct.
Part IV highlights the defense's perspective by looking at the right to be
put on notice, a number of related rights and the principle of ne bis in
idem, also known as double jeopardy protection. The analysis of these
three issues shows that courts have developed relatively sound pleading
principles over the last decades, but have mostly ignored the issue of
evidentiary precision in the sense of consistently distinguishing different
types of evidence and facts.
[Vol. 27
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II. INDICTMENTS
Disagreements as to how definite the charging instrument ought to be
are found in many domestic legal systems and are as such not unique to
prosecutions of international crimes. However, it is a recurring theme
with international criminal trials, mainly because of the perceived
prosecutorial difficulties in proving such complex crimes of a massive
scale, which the international crimes of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide undoubtedly are when focusing on high-level
accused.
Bringing charges is generally done slightly differently in adversarial
systems compared to inquisitorial systems; the common law tradition is
known for its concise indictments, while the civil law tradition employs
more elaborate and comprehensive indictments. It is useful to briefly note
this difference, because the drafters of the Nuremberg indictment felt the
distinction between the two legal systems indeed played an important
role. However, neither legal family represents a pure model. Variations
exist among legal systems belonging to one tradition and some systems
are mixed.6 Also, similarities between the two exist where general
principles are derived from international human rights instruments.
7
Furthermore, both legal families have had a significant influence on the
charging practices of the contemporary international criminal courts and
tribunals, which have had to combine and balance the differences
between domestic practices, often leading to experimentalism and
procedural uncertainty. The importance of distinguishing between the
two major legal traditions regarding the isue at hand-indictments
involving international crimes-should therefore not be overvalued. In
this Article, the problem of case demarcation is approached from a crime-
based perspective, not a system-based perspective.8 This means that the
court, or the legal system, in which the crime is prosecuted ought not be
a differentiating factor nor eventually the focus; the massive scale and
complex nature of international crimes is.
A. IMT, IA4TF, and Control Council Law No. 10
The form of the first international indictment of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal (IMT) is said to be the result of a
compromise between the common law countries and the civil law
countries. The IMT's Chief U.S. Prosecutor Robert Jackson later stated
6.Id. at 460.
7. Id.
8. See generally Elinor Fry, The Nature of International Crimes and Evidentiary Challenges:
Preserving Quality While Managing Quantity, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014).
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that the Soviet lawyers advocated for a detailed indictment with a
complete statement of all evidence against the accused, while the
American and British lawyers would have found a simple indictment
charging the crimes that would later be proved more appropriate.
Supported by the French and Soviet (civil law) lawyers and more in
accordance with the German (civil law) practice, the indictment at the
IMT more or less turned out as envisaged by the Soviet delegation,
according to Jackson.9 Indeed, the Soviet prosecutor, General R.A.
Rudenko, left a considerable mark on the endeavor, as he was the one
who suggested dividing the indictment into four counts, with each
delegation being responsible for one count.'0 Some accounts of the
drafting process talk of a slightly less than harmonious process, though,
namely one that was controlled by the Americans." Jackson allegedly
had a clear strategy to ensure American control over the prosecution's
case, as evidenced by a memorandum sent to trial counsel Robert Storey
in which Jackson wrote he intended on "keeping control of the bulk of
the case in American hands."'
2
The Tribunal's Charter reads, in relevant part, that the "Indictment
9. See Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an International Legal System, 22
TEMP. L.Q. 147, 151 (1948). For the discussion on the form of the indictment between Justice
Jackson and General Nikitchenko, see also REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, Document XXI: Minutes of
Conference Session of July 3, 1945, London, 1945, at 154, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
MilitaryLaw/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf. General Nikitchenko states that:
[i]n the opinion of the Soviet Delegation this procedure would on the one
hand insure a fair trial since the defendant would be given every chance to refute
the evidence produced against him and would, on the other hand, insure him
promptness of trial since most of the preliminary work would have been done
before.
Id.
10. See DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR'S
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT, Vol. 1, at 97 (1998).
11. Id.
12. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 99 (1992). Taylor quotes
a memorandum sent by Jackson to Robert Storey on September 17, 1945, in the midst of drafting,
saying:
I do not think division of work is advisable in view of the situation
concerning our fellow-prosecutors. Candidly, I think we must utilize Committee
4 [chaired by Jackson] as the basis for keeping control of the bulk of the case in
American hands. To this end, I think.. . that Committee 4 will have to take
primary responsibility for the development of the case in all its aspects on the
questions of common plan conspiracy and individual and organizational
responsibilities.
Taylor himself adds: "For 'Committee 4' read 'Jackson."' Id.
[Vol. 27
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shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges against the
Defendants."13 The indictment of 66 pages with four counts against 23
individuals and 6 organizations relayed the particulars on individual
criminal responsibility, criminality of groups and organizations, and
violations of international treaties, agreements, and assurances in three
narrating appendices. Count 1 dealt with the common plan and
conspiracy, and was done in such a comprehensive manner by Committee
4 led by the Americans that it left very little substance for Committee 1
led by the British in charge of count 2. Count 2 on crimes against peace
was a one-pager only charging the actual attacks and occupied countries.
Count 3 and 4, drafted by both Committees 2 and 3 headed by the Soviets
and the French respectively, dealt with war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and were more comprehensive.
14
The indictment itself (i.e., the four counts), did not mention the
accused individually. It only referred to them as "all the defendants." The
defendants' names and specific roles were listed in appendix 1, which
devoted one short paragraph to each defendant stating their occupation
and activities during the war as well as one- or two-sentence explanations
of their involvement in each count. The printed version of the
indictment's official English translation took up more than 65 pages.'
5
Compared to a contemporary international indictment against only one
high-level accused, as often encountered at the ICTY for instance, the
Nuremberg document was rather concise. For instance, the indictment
against Radovan Karad~i6 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) consists of 11 counts explained in 40 pages,
and includes 7 tables listing specific incidents relating to the crimes
charged.16 Despite the Nuremberg indictment's potential flaws against
modem day standards, the trial record does not reveal any defense
grievances with respect to vagueness. Most litigation centered on issues
such as fitness to stand trial,' 7 and the legality principle.'8
Nuremberg's counterpart, the International Military Tribunals for the
Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo, has a different history. While the United
States was the main driving force behind the tribunal coming into being,
13. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 16(a), Aug. 8, 1982, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
14. See TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 79-80.
15. See SPRECHER, supra note 10, at 104.
16. See Prosecutor v. KaraMi, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Prosecution's Marked-Up Indictment
(Oct. 19,2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/ind/en/markedupindictment_091019.pdf.
17 See, e.g., Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen for Postponement of
the Trial as to Him, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Nov. 4, 1945, available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/imt/vl-09.asp; Motion on Behalf of Defendant Hess for an Examination by aNeutral
Expert with Reference to his Mental Competence and Capacity to Stand Trial, Nuremberg Trial
Proceedings Vol. 1, Nov. 7, 1945, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imtlvl-26.asp.
18 See Motion Adopted by All Defense Counsel, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Nov.
19, 1945, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/vl -30.asp.
7
Fry: International Crimes and Case Demarcation: What Are We Trying to
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
it is said that the indictment was completely dominated by the assigned
subcommittee's British chair, Comyns-Carr.9 Others, however, have
suggested that Comyns-Carr merely merged various suggestions made by
the 11 Allied powers involved in the drafting process, concluding that the
indictment was a mix of common law and civil law features.20 In any
event, discussions on the level of detail required in an indictment such as
had occurred in Nuremberg, presumably because of the strong Soviet
presence, seems not to have occurred during the drafting process in
Tokyo.
The IMTFE Charter stated that the "indictment shall consist of a plain,
concise, and adequate statement of each offence charged,",2 1 which is
different than the text of the Nuremberg Charter, which spoke of "full
particulars specifying in detail." This difference is likely the result of the
U.S. dominance of the entire IMTFE project, but it cannot be said with
certainty that this difference in wording directly influenced the difference
in form of the indictments. The indictment's drafters probably had the
biggest influence, and the end result of their efforts did not go without
criticism. The Tokyo indictment departed from the Nuremberg example
in the sense that it contained a much greater number of individual
charges, creating many overlaps in relation to the underlying factual
substance of the charges.2 2 Five appendices accompanied the indictment
to provide the particulars of the numerous counts, but these were grouped
thematically instead of per charge.23 There were 28 defendants in total
and 55 counts that were divided into three groups: (1) crimes against the
peace, (2) murder, and (3) conventional war crimes and crimes against
humanity.2 1 Similar to the Nuremberg indictment, the defendants' names
and occupations were listed in one of the appendices, yet hardly any
specifics were provided regarding the defendants' individual movements
and activities during the war.
Quite some litigation relating to the vagueness of the indictment
unfolded. The defense argued that the indictment failed to provide the
essential facts to adequately support the charges,25 and that it neglected
19. See PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN
THE EAST, 1945-1951, at 14 (1979); NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL 69 (2008).
20. BOLSTER & CRYER, supra note 19, at 70.
21. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 9(a), Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
22. See BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 19, at 70.
23. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East (United States v. Araki), Indictment
Annex 6 to the Judgment (Apr. 29, 1946), reprinted in NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER,
DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO MILITARY TRIBUNAL 16-69 (2008), also available at
http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokyo.anklageschrift.pdf [hereinafter IMTFE Indictment].
24. Id.
25. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East (United States v. Araki), Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment (May 25, 1946), Paper no. 85, Motions Presented to the Court Vol. 1 (May
[Vol. 27
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to specify times, places, and their clients' involvement in each of the
crimes charged.26 The Prosecution argued that as long as the beginning
and end of the conspiracy are specified, details relating to when important
events occurred, where they occurred, and who was involved were to be
left as matters of proof.27 The defense's complaints were all dismissed
before the final judgment was rendered. President Webb opined that time
and place had to be stated broadly.28 Furthermore, it was unnecessary to
specify the actual role an accused played in a conspiracy or to state the
location it took place.29 In the end, the Tribunal's judgment dismissed 45
of the 55 counts, not due to lack of specificity, but on grounds of
redundancy, lack of jurisdiction, and merging counts due to overlap.
30
Most of the indictments in the ensuing 12 Nuremberg cases-the
subsequent trials conducted under Control Council Law No. 10 in
Nuremberg by U.S. military tribunals-were rather elaborate; they
targeted certain crimes more narrowly and focused on defendants of a
lower level than at the IMTs. While elaborateness does not necessarily
preclude vagueness, the indictments did not seem to suffer from too much
lack of specificity compared to the Tokyo indictment, although that may
also only appear to be so because it was not litigated. However, from the
indictments alone it is not always clear what role the defendants played
in which acts that constituted the crimes. The assertions on underlying
facts and personal involvement remained rather vague, and some
indictments only specified defendants' positions and related
responsibilities in general. For example, the indictment in the Medical
case (or 'Doctors' Trial) specified the horrific experiments that were
conducted upon concentration camp prisoners during the war, and stated
3, 1946-Oct. 14, 1946), Northcroft Archive, Macmillan Brown Library, University of Canterbury,
New Zealand (cited by BOLSTER & CRYER, supra note 19, at 71).
26. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East (United States v. Araki), Motion for
Bill of Particulars (no date), Paper no. 56, Motions Presented to the Court Vol. 1 (May 3, 1946-
Oct. 14, 1946), Northcroft Archive, Macmillan Brown Library, University of Canterbury, New
Zealand (cited by BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 19, at 71).
27. See BOISTER& CRYER, supra note 19, at 73.
28. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings in Chambers, Saturday
25 May 1946: On a Motion by Hiranuma, Kiichiro; Matsuoka, Yosuke; Shigemitsu, Mamoru;
Togo, Shigenori; and Umezu, Yoshijiro, for Bill of Particulars; A Motion by All the Accused for
a Bill of Particulars; and other motions, Vol. 1, Proceedings in Chambers (May 8, 1946-July 24,
1946), Northcroft Archive, Macmillan Brown Library, University of Canterbury, New Zealand,
at 20ff (cited by BOiSTER & CRYER, supra note 19, at 72).
29. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East (United States v. Araki), Order
Dismissing Motion for Bill of Particulars (May 25, 1946), Paper no. 86, Orders on Motions
Presented to the Court, Vol. I (Apr. 29, 1947-Dec. 27, 1946), Northcrofl Archive, Macmillan
Brown Library, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (cited by BOLSTER & CRYER, supra note
19, at 72).
30. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East (United States v. Araki), Judgment
§§ 447-454 (Nov. 4-12, 1948), available at http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokio.pdf" See also
BOLSTER & CRYER, supra note 19, at 73.
9
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which of the 23 defendants were involved. With respect to most accused,
however, it did not specify individual acts or factual connections to the
crimes. It merely stated the defendants "are charged with special
responsibility for and participation in these crimes."31 The same format
was followed in other cases, too. For instance, in the Justice indictment,
the Ministry of Justice was named as the main entity that had committed
the crimes listed in each of the paragraphs that all ended with a sentence
naming the defendants as responsible without specifying their precise
actions.32 The same was done in the RuSHA indictment.33 Similarly, in
Milch, the sole defendant Erhard Milch's involvement was explained in
general terms relating to his membership of the Central Planning Board
and his several high positions in the German air force.34 The same can be
said of the defendants in the rather short indictment of Pohl. The 17
accused were hardly individualized apart from their held positions.
35
The more elaborate indictments, such as in the cases of the Ministries,
L G. Farben, Krupp, High Command, and Flick, of which the last three
also included appendices explaining company and military structures as
well as defendants' histories, were very similar to contemporary
international indictments with respect to the level of detail.36 Conversely,
the Einsatzgruppen indictment and the Hostage indictment were both
concise yet very specific and factually comprehensive in a different way
than the other post-war charging documents. The Einsatzgruppen
indictment identified the number of victims made by the various units and
the dates the killings took place.37 The level of the indictment's
specificity was the result of the fact that most of the information
supporting the charges came from Otto Ohlendorf's earlier testimony at
the IMT. Ohlendorf, who had been Major General of the SS, member of
the SD, and Commanding Officer of Einsatzgruppe D, had given a
remarkably extensive and candid testimony about the crimes committed
31. See Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) Nuremburg 1946, NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 2 (Oct. 25, 1946) (count two-war crimes), available at http://www.loc.gov
/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NTIndictments.pdf#page=2.
32. See id. at 21 (United States v. Josef Alst6tter) (Justice Case).
33. See id at 162 (United States v. Ulrich Greifeldt) (RuSHA Case).
34. See id. at 14 (United States v. Erhard Milch) (Milch Case).
35. See id. at 36 (United States v. Oswald Pohl) (Pohl Case) (count 1: each paragraph's final
sentence(s) stating which defendant was part of which Amtsgruppe) (counts 3,4,5 on war crimes,
crimes against humanity and membership in a criminal organization only speak of "all of the
defendants" without making any reference to the accused individually).
36. United States v. Ernst von Weizsdcker (Ministries Case or Wilhelmstrasse Trial),
Indictment, U.S. Military Tribunal, 1947; United States v. Carl Krauch (I.G. Farben Case),
Indictment, U.S. Military Tribunal, 1947, § 7; United States v. Alfried Krupp (Krupp Case),
Indictment, U.S. Military Tribunal, 1947; United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High Command
Case), Indictment, U.S. Military Tribunal, 1947; United States v. Friedrich Flick (Flick Case),
Indictment, U.S. Military Tribunal, 1947.
37. See id. at 176 (United States v. Otto Ohlendorf) (Einsatzgruppen Case).
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by his and other units. 38 The Hostage indictment displayed a similar level
of specificity; dates and numbers of victims were included in the
document's four counts.39 Here, too, the reason for precision of facts had
an evidentiary basis. Documentary evidence was readily available and the
case benefitted from evidence presented at the IMT trial.40
Lack of specificity in charging does not appear to have been argued at
the IMT or the subsequent rials in Nuremberg as it had been in Tokyo.
However, a certain amount of inevitability in this respect was stipulated
in one of the subsequent proceedings. In the Justice case judgment, the
judges reminded that:
Defendants are charged with crimes of such immensity that mere
specific instances of criminality appear insignificant by
comparison. The charge, in brief, is that of conscious participation
in a nation-wide governmentally organized system of cruelty and
injustice, in violation of the laws of war and of humanity, and
perpetrated in the name of law by the authority of the Ministry of
Justice, and through the instrumentality of the courts. [... ] The
record is replete with evidence of specific criminal acts, but they
are not the crimes charged in the indictment. They constitute
evidence of the intentional participation of the defendants and
serve as illustrations of the nature and effect of the greater crimes
charged in the indictment. Thus it is that the apparent generality of
the indictment was not only necessary but proper. No indictment
couched in specific terms and in the manner of the common law
could have encompassed within practicable limits the generality of
the offense with which these defendants stand charged.4'
Although some of these early (international and military) indictments
were very elaborate, the specific acts with which the accused were
charged remained vague at times, in the sense that the link between the
accused and the crimes charged was mostly demonstrated by the position
held by the accused. Moreover, the temporal scopes of these indictments
were relatively precise yet very wide, making the cases less defined
38. See Transcript of Otto Ohlendorf's testimony at 311-54 (Jan. 3, 1946), IMT Proceedings
vol. 4 (part 1 of 3), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-03-46.asp#ohlendorf; see also
KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 63-64 (2011).
39. See NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 31, at 139 (United States v. Wilhelm
List) (Hostage Case).
40. See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 80 (Aug. 15, 1949),
available at http://www.loc.govlrr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NTjfinal-report.pdf.
41. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAWNO. 10, Vol. III, at 984-85 (1951).
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(although to some extent this fits the nature of the charge of conspiracy):
the Nuremberg indictment included Hitler's first attempt to come to
power in 1923 and covered the entire period until May 8, 1945;42 the
Tokyo indictment covered a span from January 1, 1928 to September 2,
1945;43 the I.G. Farben indictment goes back to 1932 when the alliance
of the corporation with Hitler and the Nazi Party was formed, and
defendants Beutefish and Gattineau, representing Farben, met with Hitler
to discuss business;44 the Ministries, High Command, Krupp, Pohl and
Justice indictments all cover events from January 1933-when Hitler was
appointed Chancellor by President Paul Von Hindenburg-to April or
May 1945; the other indictments in the subsequent proceedings covered
smaller time spans (from September 1939 to April or May 1945).
41
Only the IMTFE record shows that litigation occurred on the issue of
vagueness, and even there, all objections along these lines were
discarded. Were these indictments flawed from a contemporary
perspective? They usually contained the following elements: (1) the
defendant's link to the legal definition of the crime (X did crime Y), (2)
statements of general facts (without reference to defendants), and (3) the
defendant's professional position or occupation preceding and during the
war. Lacking was the following crucial element, without which
conducting a defense becomes an extremely difficult task: the link
between the defendant (i.e., the physical person, not their employment
position, and the facts, not the crime definition, committed by them). As
will become apparent in the next subsection, compared to contemporary
international criminal tribunals, these indictments were not nearly
specific enough, most notably in relation to the defendants' individual
acts.
B. The Contemporary Ad Hoc and Hybrid Institutions
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) both state that the prosecutor "shall prepare an indictment
containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with
which the accused is charged under the Statute."46 The Special Court for
42. See United States v. Goering, IMT, Oct. 6, 1945, reprinted in 1 Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 27, 41 (1948), count 1; United States v.
Goering, IMT, Count 2, 3, and 4 (Sept. 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945).
43. See IMTFE Indictment, supra note 23.
44. See NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 31, at 67 (United States v. Carl
Krauch) (I.G. Farben Case).
45. With the exception of the temporally narrower Einsatzgruppen case indictment, which,
apart from the common membership count, only dealt with crimes committed between May 1941
and July 1943.
46. Statute of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 18(4) (2009);
[Vol. 27
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Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) do not
contain such a provision in their statutes, but provide guidance in their
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). The SCSL RPE specifies that
"[t]he indictment shall contain, and be sufficient if it contains, the name
and particulars of the suspect, a statement of each specific offence of
which the named suspect is charged and a short description of the
particulars of the offence."'47 It also states that it "shall be accompanied
by a Prosecutor's case summary briefly setting out the allegations he
proposes to prove in making his case."48 The STL RPE provides, identical
to the equivalent provisions in the ICTY and ICTR RPEs, that "[t]he
indictment shall set forth the name and particulars of the suspect and a
concise statement of the facts of the case and of the crime with which the
suspect is charged.",49 The Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) use a different phrasing, stating that
"[t]he Indictment shall be void for procedural defect unless it sets out the
identity of the Accused, a description of the material facts and their legal
characteri[z]ation by the Co-Investigating Judges, including the relevant
criminal provisions and the nature of the criminal responsibility."
50
It is important to keep in mind that specificity of charges is something
else than the scope of indictments. Breadth or narrowness with respect to
facts and time periods does not necessarily preclude specificity, even
though in practice breadth and vagueness may be linked. In light of this,
it is worth noting that when it comes to scope the ad hoc Tribunals have
gone through an interesting development, too. Initially, ICTY and ICTR
prosecutors' approach to charging mirrored the international precedent of
the IMT and IMTF, and many of the early indictments included a wide
Statute of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 17(4) (1994), amended by S.C. Res. 1431,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (Aug. 14, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
47. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Rule 47(C) (2002)
(amended May 31, 2012) [hereinafter SCSL RPE].
48. Id.
49. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Rule 68(D) (2009),
U.N. Doc. STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.6-Corr.1 (amended Apr. 9, 2013 and corrected Apr. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter STL RPE]; see also Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia Rule 47(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006); Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rule 47(C), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV. 1
(1995) (amended Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter ICTR RPE].
50. Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Rule 67(2),
Rev. 8 Aug. 3, 2011, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/
ECCC%201ntemal%2ORules%20(Rev.8)%2OEnglish.pdf [hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules].
The same provision can be found in the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, art. 35 new (a), with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on Oct.
27, 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_
Law as amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [hereinafter ECCC Law]. The ECCs Law, however,
does not specify what the Closing Order, which refers to either the indictment or a dismissal order
issued by the Co-Investigating Judges, must contain.
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range of offences and historical background.51  After Slobodan
Milogevir's death in March 2006 before the completion of his trial, the
judges at the ICTY amended the RPE in order to create more options for
trial chambers to encourage prosecutors to reduce indictments.52 In
Karadii6, the Trial Chamber (TC) used Rule 73 bis to urge the prosecutor
to trim the indictment by limiting the number of charges, crimes scenes
and witnesses.53 It noted that Rule 73 bis (D) and (E) allow for four forms
of direct or indirect action by a Chamber, namely: (1) the Chamber can
invite the Prosecution to reduce the number of counts charged; (2) the
Chamber can fix the number of crime sites; (3) the Chamber can fix the
number of incidents; and (4) the Chamber can direct the Prosecution to
select the counts upon which to proceed.54
There is no similar provision at the ICTR, but the Rwanda Tribunal
has experienced a similar development toward streamlining indictments
in pursuance of more manageable cases. The early indictments at the
ICTR were grouped thematically, much like the subsequent rials in
Nuremberg, and involved many defendants.55 The Tribunal later
51. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milo~evi , Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment, 52-79
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/slobodanmilosevic/ind/en/mil-ai040421-e.htm ("additional facts") later amended by
Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
slobodanmilosevic/ind/en/040727.pdf, containing 66 counts; see also Jeffrey Locke,
Indictments, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 604,616 (Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012).
52. The following sentence (emphasized) was added to ICTY RPE rule 73 bis (D) in May
2006, two months after Milogevid's death in March 2006: "After having heard the Prosecutor, the
Trial Chamber, in the interest of a fair and expeditious trial, may invite the Prosecutor to reduce
the number of counts charged in the indictment and may fix a number of crime sites or incidents
comprised in one or more of the charges in respect of which evidence may be presented by the
Prosecutor which, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the crimes charged
in the indictment, their classification and nature, the places where they are alleged to have been
committed, their scale and the victims of the crimes, are reasonably representative of the crimes
charged." ICTY RPE, supra note 4, r.73 bis(D). The following sentence (emphasized) was added
to Rule 73 bis(E) at the same time:
Upon or after the submission by the pre-trial Judge of the complete file of
the Prosecution case pursuant to paragraph (L)(i) of Rule 65 [ter], the Trial
Chamber, having heard the parties and in the interest of a fair and expeditious
trial, may direct the Prosecutor to select the counts in the indictment on which to
proceed. Any decision taken under this paragraph may be appealed as of right by
a party.
Id. r.73 bis(E).
53. See Prosecutor v. Karadlid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Order to the Prosecution under
Rule 73 bis(D), 5-6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 22, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/ cases/karadzic/tord/en/090723.pdf.
54. See id. 3.
55. See, e.g., Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Bagosora,
Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva given life sentences; Kabiligi acquitted, ICTR/INFO-9-2-582.EN
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switched from a "multi-accused" to a "single-accused" approach,
narrowing the scope of indictments.56 This was given an extra push by
the ICTR completion strategy imposed by the U.N. Security Council.57
While the scope of indictments is a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
requirements relating to specificity of charges are legal matters. These
have evolved, too, and the idea that there exists a certain amount of
inevitability when it comes to vague indictments has gradually lost
support in the jurisprudence of the contemporary international criminal
tribunals. An early Trial Chamber decision in Blagkic provided that "an
indictment, by its very nature and given the very initial phase in which it
is reviewed, is inevitably concise and succinct,,18 and gave the basic
principles regarding content: "the indictment must contain certain
information which permits the accused to prepare his defence (namely,
the identity of the victim, the place and approximate date of the alleged
crime and the means used to perpetrate it) in order to avoid prejudicial
surprise.' 59 The ICTY Appeals Chamber judgment in Kupregkk et aL
provided more detailed guidance and is a leading authority at the
international tribunals with respect to the issue of specificity of charges.
60
The judges reminded that: "[a] decisive factor in determining the degree
of specificity with which the Prosecution is required to particularize the
facts of its case in the indictment is the nature of the alleged criminal
conduct charged to the accused.",6 1 In large part, this consideration is
influenced by the position-both physically and legally--of the accused:
In a case based upon individual responsibility where the accused
is alleged to have personally done the acts pleaded in the
(Dec. 18, 2008) (Military I Case); Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Appeals Chamber Delivers Judgement in Military II Case, ICTR/1NFO-9-2-752.EN (Feb. 11,
2014) (Military II Case); see also Locke, supra note 51, at 618.
56. See Locke, supra note 51, at 619. See also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ildephonse Nizeyimana,
Case No. ICTR-00-5 5-PT, Second Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 17,
2010), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNizeyimana%5Cindictment%5Cni
zeyimanaindictment_101217e.pdf.
57. See Locke, supra note 51, at 618; see generally Paul Ng'arua, Specificity of Indictments
in ICTR Genocide Trials, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE
AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 175 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007).
58. Prosecutor v. Bla~kic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Defence Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment Based upon Defects in the Form Thereof (Vagueness/Lack of Adequate
Notice of Charges), 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 1997), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tdec/en/70404DC113291.htm [hereinafter Bla~kic Defects
Decision].
59. Id. 20.
60. See generally Chile Eboe-Osuji, 'Vague' Indictments and Justice at the International
Criminal Tribunals: Learning from the World of Common Law, in BRITISH AND CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (Christopher P.M. Waters ed., 2006).
61. See Prosecutor v. Kupregki&, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, 89 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/
kup-aO 1023e.pdf [hereinafter Kupre~kid Appeal Judgment].
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indictment, the material facts must be pleaded with precision - the
information pleaded as material facts must, so far as it is possible
to do so, include the identity of the victim, the places and the
approximate date of those acts and the means by which the offence
was committed. Where the prosecution is unable to specify any of
these matters, it cannot be obliged to perform the impossible.
Where the precise date cannot be specified, a reasonable range of
dates may be sufficient. Where a precise identification of the
victim or victims cannot be specified, a reference to their category
or position as a group may be sufficient. Where the prosecution is
unable to specify matters such as these, it must make it clear in the
indictment that it is unable to do so and that it has provided the best
information it can.
62
The scale of the crimes plays a role here, too, since magnitude "makes
it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters as
the identity of the victims and the dates for the commission of the
crimes.
63
Thus, there are two factors that determine the required degree of
specificity: (1) the proximity of the accused to the crime (geographically
but more importantly in terms of mode of liability: if the accused directly
committed the crime, the material facts comprising the crime must be
pleaded in great detail); and (2) the nature of the crime, including the
scale and magnitude. If the accused is alleged to have personally
committed the crime, as opposed to being charged as an accessory or
under command or superior forms of liability, the material facts will
include such details as the identity of the victim, the location and the
approximate date of the events in question, and the means by which the
offence was committed.64 As noted by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, "the
62. Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talid, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Objections by Momir
TalH to the Form of the Amended Indictment, 9 22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/ 10220F1214869.htm
[hereinafter Brdanin & Tali Decision on Objections by Talif] (summarizing and citing Kupreikid
Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 89 & Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Decision
on Preliminary Motion on Form of Amended Indictment, 18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 11, 2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/tdec/en/
0021 1A1212639.htm [hereinafter Kmojelac, Feb. 11, 2000 Decision]). See also Prosecutor v.
Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence, 32 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Feb. 25, 2004), https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/IMANISHIMWEICTR-97-
36/IMANISHIMWEICTR-99-46-T.pdf [hereinafter Ntagerura Trial Judgment].
63. Kuprekid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 89; see also Kmojelac, Feb. 11, 2000
Decision, supra note 62, 18; Brdanin & Tali Decision on Objections by Talid, supra note 62,
22.
64. See Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62, 99 32, 35; Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No.
ICTR-00-61-I, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion, 8 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar.
29, 2004), http://www.unictr.orglPortals/O/Case/English/Gatete/decisions/040326.pdf (citing
Kupregki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 9 89); Prosecutor v. Gali, Case No. Case: IT-98-29-
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Prosecution's obligation to provide particulars in the indictment is at its
highest when it seeks to prove that the accused killed or harmed a specific
individual."65 The demanded degree of specificity is therefore a sliding
scale from extreme precision to the relative ambiguity depending on the
position of the accused:
[a]s the proximity of the accused person to those events becomes
more distant, less precision is required in relation to those
particular details, and greater emphasis is placed upon the conduct
of the accused person himself upon which the prosecution relies to
establish his responsibility as an accessory or as a superior to the
persons who personally committed the acts giving rise to the
charges against him.
66
Consequently, the required degree of specificity is lower where
criminal responsibility is based on accomplice liability or superior
responsibility.67 In this context, it is vital for the accused to know from
the indictment just what that alleged proximity is.
68
In relation to the nature of the crimes, the Kupreki6 AC explained
that when a crime involves an extended number of victims, for instance
AR72, Decision on Application by Defence for Leave to Appeal, 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acdec/en/
11 130F1317059.htm [hereinafter Gali6 Decision].
65. Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Cases Nos. ICTR-96-1 0-A and ICTR-96-
17-A, Appeal Judgment, 74 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 13,2004), http://www.unictr.org/
Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNtakirutimanaE%5Cdecision2%5 C041213_appealjudgement.p
df [hereinafter Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment].
66. Gali Decision, supra note 64, 15. See also Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62,
33.
Where an accused is charged with a form of accomplice liability, the
Prosecutor must plead with specificity the acts by which the accused allegedly
planned, instigated, ordered, or aided and abetted in the crime. Where superior
responsibility is alleged, the relationship of the accused to his subordinates is
most material, as are his knowledge of the crimes and the necessary and
reasonable measures that he failed to take to prevent the crimes or to punish his
subordinates.
Id. (References omitted).
67. See Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62, 35; Prosecutor v. Rasim Deli, Case No.
IT-04-83-PT, Decision on the Prosecution's Submission of Proposed Amended Indictment and
Defence Motion Alleging Defects in Amended Indictment, 85 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/tribunalen.nsf/ac9cb6430e
6e0049cl 2571 b50050bed9/60522d262b405a61 c 257 1 fe004beSac/$FILE/Delic%20TCD%2030
-06-2006.pdf.
68. See Prosecutor v. Brdanin & TaliH, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Objections by
Radoslav Brdanin to the Form of the Amended Indictment, 13 (Feb. 23, 2001), available at
http://www. icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10223FI214978.htm.
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because of an exponential amount of attacks over a prolonged period of
time and in a great number of locations, the prosecution need not specify
every victim. However, if the prosecution possesses uch information, it
should name the victims.69 With regard to the scale of international
crimes, the SCSL Trial Chamber in Sesay allowed similar vagueness with
respect to locations:
It is inaccurate to suggest that the phrases "various locations" and
"various areas including" in the relevant counts are completely
devoid of details as to what is being alleged. Whether they are
permissible or not depends primarily upon the context. For
example, paragraphs 41, 44, 45, and 51 allege that the acts took
place in various locations within those districts, a much narrower
geographical unit than, for example "within the Southern or
Eastern Province" or "within Sierra Leone." This is clearly
permissible in situations here the alleged criminality was of what
seems to be cataclysmic dimensions. By parity of reasoning, the
phrases "such as" and "including but not limited to" would, in
similar situations, be acceptable if the reference is, likewise, to
locations but not otherwise. It is therefore the Chamber's thinking
that taking the Indictment in its entirety, it is difficult to fathom
how the Accused is unfairly prejudiced by the use of said phrases
in the context herein.
70
In sum, and as identified by ICTY and STL trial chambers,7' there are
a number of general principles relating to indictments that can be derived
from the ad hoc Tribunals' case law: (1) the indictment must contain
enough detail to inform the accused clearly of the nature and cause of the
charges to allow him or her to prepare a defense;72 (2) all material facts
69. See Kupre~kid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, § 90.
70. Prosector v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2003-05-PT, Decision and Order on Defence
Preliminary Motion for Defects in the Form of the Indictment, § 23 (Oct. 13, 2003),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUFR/05-080/SCSL-03-05-PT-080.pdf [hereinafter
Sesay Indictment Decision].
71. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanigi6 & Zupljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-PT, Decision on Mido
Stanigii's and Stojan 2 upljanin's Motions on Form of the Indictment, 7-17 (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin-stanisicmi/tdec/en/090319.pdf [hereinafter Stanigid &
2 upljanin Decision]; Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL-I 1-01iPT/TC, Decision on Alleged
Defects in the Form of the Amended Indictment of 21 June 2013, 17 (Sept. 13, 2013), available
at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl- 11-0 1/main/filings/orders-and-decisions/trial-chamber/
fl 105 [hereinafter Ayyash Decision].
72. See Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-171 1-A, Judgment, 61, 147 (July 21,
2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzijaacjug/en/fur-ajOO0721e.pdf [hereinafter
Furund~ija Appeal Judgment]; Kupregkid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 88; Prosecutor v.
Blagkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 209 (July 29, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf [hereinafter Blakid Appeal
Judgment]; Prosecutor v Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 116 (Mar. 22, 2006),
[Vol. 27
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substantiating the charges must be pleaded, but it is not required to plead
the evidence used to prove the material facts;73 (3) each of the material
facts must be pleaded expressly, however, in some circumstances it may
suffice if they are expressed by necessary implication;74 (4) an indictment
must be considered as a whole, not as a series of paragraphs existing in
isolation;75 (5) whether a fact is material depends on the nature of the
prosecution case;76 (6) decisive in this respect is the nature of the alleged
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf [hereinafter Stakid Appeal
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Appeal Judgment, 20 (Nov. 28, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/simic/acjug/en/061128.pdf[hereinafter Simid Appeal Judgment]; see
also Ntabakuze v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-41A-A, Appeal Judgment, 30 (May 8, 2012),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNtabakuze%5CJudgement%5C I20508.p
df, and the line of authority at the ICTR cited there.
73. See Prosecutor v. Naletilid & Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Appeal Judgment, 23
(May 3, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilicmartinovic/acjug/en/nal-aj060503e.pdf
[hereinafter Naletilid & Martinovi6 Appeal Judgment]; Bla~ki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72,
210; Stakid Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 116; Furund2ija Appeal Judgment, supra note
72, 61, 147, 153; Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, ICTR-99-46-A, Appeal Judgment, 21 (July 7,
2006), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Ntagerura/judgement/060707.pdf
[hereinafter Ntagerura Appeal Judgment]; Simi6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 20.
74. See Prosecutor v. Halilovi6, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Appeal Judgment, 86 (Oct. 16,
2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/acjug/en/071016.pdf [hereinafter Halilovid Appeal
Judgment]; Blaki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 219; Prosecutor v. Rasevid, Case No. IT-
97-25/1-PT, Decision Regarding Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of Indictment, 18
(Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/todovicrasevic/tdec/en/040428.htm;
Prosecutor v. Mrl~id, Case No. IT-95-13/1-PT, Decision on Form of Indictment, 12 (June 19,
2003), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/tdec/en/030619.htm [hereinafter Mrkgi6
Indictment Decision]; Prosecutor v. Had ihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision
on Form of Indictment, 10 (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
hadzihasanovic kubura/tdec/en/l 1207FI216966.htm [hereinafter Hadfihasanovid & Kubura
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talid, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Fourth
Amended Indictment, 12 (Nov. 23, 2001), http://sim.law.uu.n/sim/caselaw/tribunalen.
nsf/eea9364f4188dcc0c 1257 lb500379d39/6804b868ef218604cl2571 fe004be57e/$FILE/Brdjan
in%20TCD%2023-11-2001.pdf; Brdanin & Talid Decision on Objections by Talik, supra note 62,
48.
75. See Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, 266
(Mar. 15, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic kubura/tjug/en/had-judg060315e.
pdf; Prosecutor v. Prlid, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision on Prosecution Application for Leave
to Amend the Indictment and on Defence Complaints on Form of Proposed Amended Indictment,
78 (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/051018.htm;
Prosecutor v. Prli, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motions Alleging
Defect in the Form of Indictment, 13 & 50 (July 22, 2005), http://sim. law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/
tribunalen.nsf/8485fl7e3db5bb18c12571b5004ee2ld/92fld4e8470e6725c12571fe004d3322/$F
ILE/Prlic%20TCD%2022-07-2005.pdf; Mrkgi6 Indictment Decision, supra note 74, 28;
Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeal Judgment, 304 (May 26, 2003),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CRutaganda%5Cdecisions%5C30526.pdf;
Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, 123 (July 7,
2006), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Gachumbitsi/j udgement/judgement_
appeals 070706.pdf; Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgment, 27
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Seromba/ decisions/080312-
Appealsjudg.pdf; see also Had~ihasanovid & Kubura Decision, supra note 74, 38.
76. See Halilovi6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 74, 86; Naletilid & Martinovid Appeal
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criminal conduct charged against the accused, and more specifically, the
proximity of the accused to the events alleged in the indictment;7 7 (7) if
the accused person is alleged to have personally committed the acts
giving rise to the charges against him, the material facts would include
such details as the identity of the victim, the place and the approximate
date of the events in question, and the means by which the offence was
committed. As the proximity of the accused person to those events
becomes more distant, less precision is required in relation to those
particular details, and greater emphasis is placed upon the conduct of the
accused person himself upon which the prosecution relies to establish his
responsibility as an accessory or as a superior to the persons who
personally committed the acts giving rise to the charges against him;78 (8)
thus, the legal qualification of the accused's liability, including the
particulars thereof, must be expressly pleaded in the indictment;79 (9) if
the state of mind (mens rea) of the accused is relevant to the charges, the
indictment must either (i) contain the state of mind as a material fact, or
(ii) set forth the evidentiary facts (i.e., facts that prove material facts,
more on which below in Part III) from which the state of mind is to be
inferred;80 and finally, (10) a date-and by analogy other specifics such
as location-may be considered to be a material fact if it is necessary to
inform the accused clearly of the charges so that he or she may prepare
his or her defense, but a reasonable range of dates may be pleaded where
precise dates cannot be specified (a broad range of dates does not of itself
invalidate a paragraph in an indictment).8' With respect to these
Judgment, supra note 73, 24; Kupre~kid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 89; Blatkid Appeal
Judgment, supra note 72, 210.
77. See Halilovid Appeal Judgment, supra note 74, 86; Ntagerura Appeal Judgment, supra
note 73, 121; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-2S-A, Appeal Judgment, 132 (Sept. 17,
2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/acjug/en/krn-aj030917e.pdf [hereinafter Krnojelac
Appeal Judgment]; Kuprekid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 89; B laki Appeal Judgment,
supra note 72, 210.
78 See Galid Decision, supra note 64, 15; Kuprekid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61,
88-90.
79 See Simi6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 22; Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, supra note
77, 138; see also Prosecutor v. Dordevi6, Case No. IT-OS-S7/1-PT, Decision on Form of
Indictment, 9 (Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/djordjevic/tdec/en/080403.pdf
[hereinafter Dordevid Decision]; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.: IT-97-2S-PT, Decision on
Form of Second Amended Indictment, 16 (May 11, 2000), available at http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/krnojelac/tdec/en/00511FI212948.htm [hereinafter Kmojelac May 11, 2000
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Kvoka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, 28 (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.pdf [hereinafter Kvo~ka Appeal
Judgment].
10 See Mrk~id Indictment Decision, supra note 74, 11; Prosecutor Brdanin & Talk, Case IT-
99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to
Amend, 33 (June 26, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/
tdec/en/10626FI215879.htm. See also infra Part III on evidentiary facts.




Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/1
2015] INTERNATIONAL CRIMESAND CASE DEMARCATION: WHATARE WE TRYING TO PROVE? 183
principles, ICTY Chambers have stated that when particulars (dates,
locations, victims) are known to the prosecution, it should specify those
details in the indictment regardless of whether they may be deemed as
material facts.
82
In relation to the eighth principle listed above, there are a few
additional clarifications that may be deduced from case law. For instance,
the prosecution must include in the indictment whether physical
commission or participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) is
charged. 83 In other words, it is insufficient to merely make a broad
reference to Article 7(1), which deals with individual criminal
responsibility, of the ICTY Statute. Whether or not the type of JCE is to
be pleaded expressly is unclear. Most chambers at the ad hoc Tribunals
dictate that the type of JCE must be specified,84 but some state that this is
only preferable.8 All chambers seem to agree though that when charging
JCE the indictment must also include the nature, purpose, and time or
period over which the joint criminal enterprise is said to have existed, the
identity of its members insofar this is known, but at least by reference to
their category as a group, and the nature of the accused's participation in
that enterprise.
86
In case of accomplice liability, the Prosecutor must plead clearly the
acts-meaning the "particular acts" or "the particular course of
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 534 (May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf; Brdanin & Tali6 Decision on
Objections by Talid, supra note 62, 22; Rukundo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A,
Judgment, 163 (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rukundo/
decisions/101020-appeals.pdf; Bagosora & Nsengiyumva v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-
A, Judgment, 150 (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Bagosora/
Judgement/1 112 14-%20Appeals%20Judgement.pdf.
12 See Kupregkid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 90; Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka, Case No. IT-
98-30/1, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motions on the Form of the Indictment, 23 (Apr. 12,
1999), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tdec/en/ 90412FI56822.htm.
83 Simi6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 22; Kmojelac Appeal Judgment, supra note 77,
138.
8' Stanigi6 & Zupijanin Decision, supra note 71, 13; Simid Appeal Judgment, supra note
72, 22 referring to Ntagerura Appeal Judgment, supra note 73, 24; Kvodka Appeal Judgment,
supra note 79, 28; Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62, 34.
81 Kmojelac Appeal Judgment, supra note 77, 138; see also Friman et al., Charges, supra
note 5, at 387.
86 Stanigid & 2upljanin Decision, supra note 71, 13; Dordevid Decision, supra note 79,
9; Kmojelac, May 11, 2000 Decision, supra note 79, 16; Kvo~ka Appeal Judgment, supra note
79, 28; Simid Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 22; Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62,
34; Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No SCSL-2004-16-A, SCSL, Appeal Judgment, 72-86 (Feb.
22, 2008), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/AFRC/Appeal/675/SCSL-04-16-A-
675.pdf [hereinafter Brima Appeal Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T,
Decision on Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second
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conduct"8 7-by which the accused allegedly planned, instigated, ordered,
or aided and abetted in the crime.88 Additional sorts of particulars are
required when charging command or superior responsibility. The
material facts that must be pleaded in the indictment include the
accused's position as a superior of identified subordinates over whom he
or she had effective control-in the sense of a material ability to prevent
or punish criminal conduct89 - and the subordinates' acts for which he or
she is allegedly responsible.90 Also, the accused's knowledge-who must
have known or had reason to know-of the crimes must be indicated.91
Finally, the conduct of the accused by which he or she may be found to
have failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the persons who committed them must be specified.92
While SCSL Chambers at times appeared to follow ICTY and ICTR
case law with respect to indictment specificity,93 the SCSL prosecution
employed a worrisome charging method that in practice circumvented
some of the safeguards provided by the general principles listed above,
and arguably, failed to provide sufficient notice to the accused. The first
Chief Prosecutor David Crane devised a charging strategy that moved
away from the practice of relatively detailed indictments at the ICTY and
ICTR, which he thought were too long, inexact, and "fraught with
potential legal land mines."94 He opted for what he referred to as a form
of 'notice pleading,' making the indictments "simple and direct."95 This
87 Bla~kid Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 213; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-
25, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment, 13 (Feb. 24,
1999), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/tdec/en/902247325494.htm; Kmojelac,
Feb. 11, 2000 Decision, supra note 79, 18; Brdanin & Tali6 Decision on Objections by Talid,
supra note 62, 20.
88 See Brdanin & Talid Decision on Objections by Tallk, supra note 62, 20; Ntagerura Trial
Judgment, supra note 62, 33.
89 See Prosecutor v. Muci6 (Celebi6i Camp), Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Appeal Judgment, 256
(Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf.
90 See Stanigik & Zupljanin Decision, supra note 71, 14; Prosecutor v. Halilovi6, Decision
on Prosecutor's Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment, Case No IT-01-48-P, 14 (Dec.
17,2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/tdec/en/041217.htm; Blakid Appeal
Judgment, supra note 72, 218.
91 See Stanigid & Zupljanin Decision, supra note 71, T 14; Prosecutor v. Mejakik, Case No.
IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Zeljko Mejakid's Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment,
3 (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mejakic/tdec/en/031114.htm
[hereinafter Mejakik Decision]; Bla~kid Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 218.
92 See Stanigid & 7upljanin Decision, supra note 71, 14; Mejakik Decision, supra note 91;
Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62, 33.
93 See, e.g., Brima Appeal Judgment, supra note 86, 37-41; Taylor Decision, supra note
86, $T 66-68; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0 l-T, Decision on "Defence Notice of
Appeal and Submissions Regarding the Majority Decision Concerning the Pleading of JCE in the
Second Amended Indictment," T$ 14-16 (May 1, 2009), available at http://www.rscsl.org/
Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/775/SCSL-03-0 1 -T-775.pdf.
9 David Crane, Symposium: International Criminal Tribunals in the 21st Century:
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method of charging, reminiscent of the indictments in the subsequent
proceedings in Nuremberg and federal civil procedure in the United
States,96 stated the crimes' standard legal categorization and a brief
stipulation of the alleged form of liability, but it often failed to include
the link between the two and the accused's actual acts and omissions.
97
The indictment at the SCSL had to be accompanied by a separate case
summary setting out the allegations the prosecutor proposed to prove in
making the case, potentially remedying the lack of specificity in the
indictment if the two were read together. However, the case summary
could not plead material facts that were not in the indictment, and the
document was not susceptible to amendment by the Court.98 In other
words, the prosecution could change the case summary, which likely
contained vital information from a defense's perspective in light of how
concise the indictments were at the SCSL, throughout the trial without
permission from the Court, because the case summary was not considered
part of the indictment.99 This arguably resulted in ever-fluctuating factual
parameters of the case throughout the trial, which was an issue in, for
instance, the case against Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, also known as the
RUF case. Defense counsel identified the cause of this issue as the
erroneous application of two legal standards:00 (1) overreliance on the
exception-as established by the ICTY-that less specificity is required
when the crimes' massive scale makes detailed charging unrealistically
demanding,1 1 and (2) qualifying evidence, sometimes constituting new
charges or new material facts, as not new as long as it was a "building
block constituting an integral part of, and connected with, the same res
gestae [things done] forming the factual substratum of the charges in the
indictment."'0 2 The SCSL created a charging practice that will most
96 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
97 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended
Consolidated Indictment (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/
RUF/617/SCSL-04-I5-T-619.pdf; see also Wayne Jordash & Scott Martin, Due Process andFair
Trial Rights at the Special Court: How the Desire for Accountability Outweighed the Demands of
Justice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 585, 591 (2010).
98 See Taylor Decision, supra note 86, 61; Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-15-
T, Decision on Amendment of the Consolidated Indictment, 51-52 (May 16, 2005), available
at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/Appeal/397/SCSL-04-14-T-397.pdf
[hereinafter Norman Decision].
99 See Norman Decision, supra note 98, 52.
100 See Jordash & Martin, supra note 97, at 593.
101 See, e.g., Sesay Indictment Decision, supra note 70, 7.
102 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on the
Defence Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence Arising from the Supplemental Statements of
Witnesses TFI-113, TFI-108, TFI-330, TFI-041 and TF1-288, 11 (Feb. 27, 2006),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/496/SCSL-04-15-T-496.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Defence Motion Requesting the
Exclusion of Evidence Arising from the Supplemental Statements of Witnesses TFI-168, TF 1-
165 & TFI-041, 7, 11 (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/519/
23
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likely cease to exist along with the Court itself, which is now in residual
mode, but it is nevertheless an interesting example of blurred case
demarcation and confusion of charges and evidence, upon which will be
elaborated further below (Part 1II).
The ECCC, while having a completely different system, applies the
specificity requirements as articulated by the ad hoc Tribunals. Modeled
on the French civil law system, the Court has a separate Office of Co-
Investigating Judges, which conducts the investigation and concludes the
pre-trial phase with the issuance of a Closing Order (indictment)
comparable to a dossier in an inquisitorial system. The Closing Order,
"either indicting a person and sending him or her to trial or dismissing
the case," is an elaborate document that forms the parameters of the case
if indeed sent to trial.10 3 Despite its unique system impacting the way in
which charges are brought, and while formally not bound by the
jurisprudence of other tribunals, in Case 001 against Kaing Guek Eav
alias "Duch," the ECCC's Pre-Trial Chamber decided that international
standards will be applied regarding requirements of specificity in the
Closing Order because the Internal Rules do not provide further
guidance.'0 4 Indeed, also in Case 002/01 against the two surviving
accused, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, the Trial Chamber relied on
ICTY and ICTR case law on general pleading principles when discussing
the factual parameters of the case and the rights of the accused in this
respect.10 5 The example of the ECCC is consistent with the crime-based
approach of this Article: the legal system does not cause issues of case
demarcation to arise, nor does the legal system influence the way in
which specificity of charges can be safeguarded. The general pleading
principles can be legitimately applied in both dominantly adversarial and
inquisitorial systems.
C. Bringing Charges at the ICC
Like the ECCC, the ICC has a different procedural framework than
the ad hoc Tribunals. Especially regarding the charging instrument,
matters are handled differently. At the contemporary international
criminal tribunals, as was also standard procedure at the Nuremberg and
SCSL-04-15-T-519.pdf.
103 See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 50, r.67.
104 See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02),
Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting Kain Guek Eav Alias "Duch," 46
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Dec. 5, 2008),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ documents/courtdoc/D99 3 42EN 0_l.pdf.
105 See Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Decision on Defence
Preliminary Objections (Statute of Limitations on Domestic Crimes), 17-23 (Sept. 22, 2011),
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Tokyo Tribunals, the indictment is the basis for arrest.'0 6 At the ICC,
however, the document providing the basis for arrest is the arrest warrant,
which follows a separate procedure and involves a lower standard of
proof.'0 7 Moreover, not every suspect is brought into custody, and an
indictment is not a precondition for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
Whether or not present-he or she may waive this right' 08-the suspect
is subject to a confirmation of charges process whereby the Pre-Trial
Chamber decides whether the case will proceed to trial; the charging
instrument or indictment is then referred to as the Document Containing
the Charges (DCC).'°9 Because of these procedural differences, as well
as some substantive differences relating to crimes and modes of liability,
Pre-Trial Chambers have stated that the ICTY's and ICTR's case law is
of limited relevance at the ICC." l0 However, in the Lubanga Appeal
Judgment in his conviction of December 1, 20-14, the Appeals Chamber
relied heavily on the ad hoc Tribunals' case law dealing with pleading
rules without adding such a caveat.1 1
Article 61(3) of the Rome Statute, dealing with the confirmation of
charges before trial, holds that the prosecutor must provide the accused
with a copy of the DCC and the evidence upon which the prosecutor
intends to rely at the confirmation of charges hearing within a reasonable
time before that hearing.1 2 It does not indicate what should be in the
DCC, nor do the Rules provide any particular guidance. However,
Regulation 52 of the Regulations of the Court states that the DCC referred
to in Article 61 shall include "[a] statement of the facts, including the
time and place of the alleged crimes, which provides a sufficient legal
and factual basis to bring the person or persons to trial," as well as "[a]
legal characterization of the facts to accord both with the crimes under
articles 6, 7 or 8 and the precise form of participation under articles 25
and 28." In line with Article 74(2) of the Statute, "a 'charge' is composed
106 See ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 19(2) & 20(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 46, art. 18(2)
& 19(2); see also ICTY RPE, supra note 4, r.55.107 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 58 (the applicable standard being "reasonable grounds
to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court").
108 See id. art. 61(2)(a).
109 See id. art. 61 (3)(a); see also Locke, supra note 51, at 605, n.4.
110 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
0 1/07-648, Decision on the Defences' Motions Regarding the Document Containing the Charges,
6-8 (June 25, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc520404.pdf [hereinafter Katanga
& Ngudjolo Decision on Defences' Motions]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise
Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 44 (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 371733.PDF. See also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(2).
"I See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubbanga Dyilo, Case No. IC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red,
Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the "Decision
on Sentence pursuant to Article 87 of the Statute," 122, 127 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/ doc/doc 1877186.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Appeal Judgment].
112 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC rule 121(3), Sept. 3, 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3.
25
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of the facts and circumstances underlying the alleged crime as well as of
their legal characterization.'" 113 Furthermore, Article 74(2) of the Statute
makes it clear that it is those facts and circumstances that form the basis
for the charges confirmed at the pre-trial stage that are determinative of
"the factual ambit of the case for the purposes of the trial and
circumscribe [the trial] by preventing the Trial Chamber from exceeding
that factual ambit."'1 14 In fact, this flows directly from the nature of a
confirmation of charges decision: it sets the factual subject matter of the
trial, and the confirmed charges "fix and delimit ... ] the scope of the
case for the purposes of the subsequent rial."
'" 15
The "facts described in the charges" have been defined by the Appeals
Chamber as those "factual allegations which support each of the legal
elements of the crime charged."' 16 The facts described in the charges
must be distinguished from "the evidence put forward by the Prosecutor
at the confirmation hearing to support a charge [... ], as well as from
background or other information that, although contained in the
document containing the charges or the confirmation decision, does not
support the legal elements of the crime charged.""7
There is not an abundance of ICC case law dealing with the lack of
specificity of charges. Yet, there are examples of chambers relying amply
on ICTY and ICTR case law despite the procedural differences between
these courts. For example, the PTC in the Bemba case followed and
referred to the ad hoc Tribunals when holding that "in case of mass
crimes, it may be impractical to insist on a high degree of specificity."" 1
8
It continued by explaining that, similar to the way stated at the ad hoc
Tribunals, when dealing with such crimes it is not necessary for the
prosecution to show for each individual killing "the identity of the victim
113 See Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kogsey & Joshua Arap Sang,
Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 44 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
1314535.pdf [hereinafter Ruto & Sang Confirmation Decision].
114 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain & Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case
No. ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, Corrigendum of the "Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges," 34 [Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 1 036947.pdf [hereinafter
Banda & Jerbo Confirmation Decision].
11 Ruto & Sang Confirmation Decision, supra note 113, 44; Banda & Jerbo Confirmation
Decision, supra note 114, 34.
116 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, Judgment on the
appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of July
14, 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal
characterization of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the
Regulations of the Court," 90 n.163 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
790147.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Regulation 55 Decision].
117 Id. See also Ruto & Sang Confirmation Decision, supra note 113, 47.
118 See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision
on the confirmation of charges, 134 (June 15, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699
54 l.pdf [hereinafter Bemba Confirmation Decision].
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and the direct perpetrator," nor is it necessary to specify the precise
number of victims; evidence referring to "many" killings or "hundreds"
of killings may very well be used.1 19
In Mbarushimana, in which the charges against the suspect were not
confirmed, the issue of specificity-in this case in relation to locations-
played a more prominent role. The defense had raised a number of issues
in this respect, namely the prosecutor's wording that locations "include
but are not limited to," as well as phrases such as "and neighboring
villages," "surrounding villages" and "the village of W673 and W674
[.. .] in Masisi territory in the second part of 2009.-12' The prosecutor
took the stance that use of the words "include but not limited to" allowed
it to prove other events to establish the same crime, and submitted it was
permissible to charge a pattern of crimes in a defined period and
geographical area, including specific incidents as examples.121 In the
decision that declined to confirm the charges against Mbarushimana, the
Pre-Trial Chamber was alarmed by the prosecution's approach, and gave
it valuable guidance as to charging practices:
The Chamber is concerned by this attempt on the part of the
Prosecution to keep the parameters of its case as broad and general
as possible, without providing any reasons as to why other
locations where the alleged crimes were perpetrated cannot be
specifically pleaded and without providing any evidence to support
the existence of broader charges, seemingly in order to allow it to
incorporate new evidence relating to other factual allegations at a
later date without following the procedure established under article
61(9) of the Statute. The Prosecution must know the scope of its
case, as well as the material facts underlying the charges that it
seeks to prove, and must be in possession of the evidence
necessary to prove those charges to the requisite level in advance
of the confirmation hearing. The DCC must contain a statement of
the material facts underlying the charges, to include the dates and
locations of the alleged incidents to the greatest degree of
specificity possible in the circumstances.
122
The Chamber further held that broad geographic and temporal
parameters lack enough detail to inform the suspect regarding the location
1191Id.
120 Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10-465, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, 79 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
1286409.pdf [hereinafter Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision].
121 See Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10-T-6-Red2-ENG,
Transcript of Sept. 16, 2011, at 22-23, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1244722.pdf. See
also Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 120, 80.
122 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 120, 82.
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and dates of the alleged crimes.123 In the Ruto & Sang case, the use of the
word "including" when referring to specific locations was similarly held
to be too ambiguous because it implies that the specified locations are
"exemplary and not exhaustive."124
In relation to modes of liability, the PTC offered some guidance in
Katanga & Ngudjolo. When co-perpetration in accordance with Article
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute is charged, the co-perpetrators' roles and
contributions to the common plan must be clearly specified. In this
context, it is considered impermissibly vague to use open-ended language
such as that the accused contributed "in at least the following ways."
However, it is not necessary to identify every single member of a
common plan when those others are not considered co-perpetrators of the
relevant crimes. 
125
This approach was confirmed and elaborated upon, once again
referring to the ad hoc Tribunals, by the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga
Appeal Judgment. The Chamber, reminding that Lubanga was charged
and convicted based on the notion of co-perpetration based on a common
plan, formulated three points of which the accused must then be notified
with sufficient detail: "(i) his or her alleged conduct that gives rise to
criminal responsibility, including the contours of the common plan and
its implementation as well as the accused's contribution; (ii) the related
mental element; and (iii) the identities of any alleged co-perpetrators."'
126
Regarding the underlying criminal acts, the Appeals Chamber stated that
"the Prosecutor must provide details as to the date and location of the
underlying acts and identify the alleged victims to the greatest degree of
specificity possible in the circumstances." 127
While in the past having reiterated to not follow the ad hoc Tribunals'
case law in relation to pleading principles due to alleged limited
relevance, there are many overlaps in how the ICC and the ICTY and
ICTR deal with issues of lack of specificity. Moreover, in the Lubanga
Appeal Judgment, the Appeals Chamber relied heavily on the ad hoc
Tribunals' case law without asserting its alleged limited relevance.
Rightfully so, because the different procedure for bringing charges at the
ICC does not necessarily warrant an alternate approach in this respect as
shown by, for instance, the ECCC's willingness to be guided by ad hoc
Tribunal jurisprudence. As a relatively young court, the IC may therefore
benefit from the pleading principles.
123 Id. 85.
124 SeeProsecutor v. William Samoei Ruto & Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 -
522, Decision on the content of the updated document containing the charges, 32-33 (Dec. 28,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl 532402.pdf.
125 Katanga & Ngudjolo Decision on Defences' Motions, supra note 110, 33-34.
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III. CASE DEMARCATION: WHAT IS MATERIAL?
In part, the prosecution's theory of the case becomes clear through
context and background information revealing the narrative upon which
the case is built. Without such information, the account of the events as
pleaded in the indictment accompanied only by a list of evidence could
become incomprehensible. This is especially true for international crime
cases. Due to the crimes' massive scale, the facts underlying the charges
and the supporting evidence are usually of great quantity, and massive
amounts of information are hard to navigate for Chambers and the
accused without a compass in the form of a little explanation.
The need for this extra narrative element has been recognized by ICC
Chambers. Generally, it has been stated that providing a narrative that
sheds light on the prosecution's theory of the case is an important aspect
of presenting evidence at the confirmation stage of the proceedings. At
that stage, the prosecution "must offer concrete and tangible proof
demonstrating a clear line of reasoning underpinning [the] specific
allegations."'
128
As shown by the cases and general pleading principles discussed
above, the seemingly simple question of what is part of the case and what
is not, or how materiality of a certain fact is determined, has a far from
straight-forward answer in international crime cases. It is of course of
paramount importance to establish this accurately, because it goes to the
very heart of the criminal trial as tool for ascertaining the truth with
respect to the conduct of an accused. This has everything to do with
standards of proof and the right of the accused to be put on notice of the
nature and cause of the charges against him or her, the latter of which will
be discussed in Part IV. It is those facts that are material, which include
the individual crimes charged, the accused's criminal responsibility and
the contextual elements,'29 that need to be proven to the requisite standard
of proof-at the trial stage, for instance, beyond a reasonable doubt-and
eventually, may form the basis of a conviction. In other words, the
material facts are those upon which the verdict is critically dependent,130
and from which the conclusion of law is eventually drawn.
However, material facts are not the only facts involved in framing a
case against a suspect. Evidentiary facts (as they are referred to at the
ICTY and ICTR)131 or subsidiary facts (as they are referred to at the
128 See, e.g., id. 39; Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09-243,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 37 (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc819602.pdf; Banda & Jerbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 114, 37; Mbarushimana
Confirmation Decision, supra note 120, 40.129 See Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2, 19.
130 See Nuon Chea Decision, supra note 105, 19.
131 See, e.g., Blaski6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, at 219; Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No.
ICTR-0 1-76-A, Judgment, 264 (Nov. 27, 2007), http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/
29
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ICC) 132 are of a particular significance, too. In common law, evidentiary
facts have been defined as those subsidiary facts introduced to prove
material facts.'3 3 At the ICC, subsidiary facts have been defined as facts
providing background information or indirect proof of material facts.
1 34
While it seems illogical that facts would prove facts, it may be understood
as creating the following chain: direct evidence going to subsidiary
(evidentiary) facts constitutes indirect evidence going to material facts.
Material facts are then proven by inference from subsidiary (evidentiary)
facts. For the purpose of this Article, it will be assumed that evidentiary
facts and subsidiary facts refer to the same type of facts despite the
different terminology used at the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC, and the
term 'subsidiary facts' will be used hereinafter.
While the ad hoc Tribunals never devoted much attention to the
distinction between facts of a subsidiary nature and material facts, the
ICC PTC reiterated in numerous Confirmation of Charges decisions that
the facts and circumstances underlying the charges must be distinguished
from other facts not mentioned in the charges but otherwise subsidiary or
related to them.135 Yet, it is not always clear how material facts are to be
distinguished from subsidiary facts and background information, and
what role or status these other types of information have.
In addition to the need for drawing a sharper line between material
facts and other facts, a distinction must also be made between facts and
evidence. Again, this may seem an easy query. Yet, how is evidence
distinguished from facts, for instance, when subsidiary facts are used to
support other evidence, to demonstrate the material facts or to show a
certain pattern? Can subsidiary facts even take on all these roles? It is
well established that material facts must be distinguished from evidence
tendered to prove those facts-the latter does not need to be stated by the
prosecution in the indictment.136 However, confusion in this respect was
highlighted, for instance, by Gbagbo mentioned in the introduction and
more elaborately dealt with further below: the prosecution used a number
of incidents, which it classified as subsidiary facts, to support evidence
demonstrating the features of the charged incidents constituting the attack
SIMBAICTR-0 1-76/SIMBAICTR-0 1 -76-A.pdf.
132 See, e.g., Banda & Jerbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 114, 37.
113 See, e.g., Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463,470, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644 (1951): "Ultimate
facts are the final facts required to establish the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's
defense; and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts." In
common law, material facts are usually referred to as "ultimate facts," but that terminology is not
used at the international criminal courts and tribunals. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500
(5th ed. 1979).
1' See Banda & Jerbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 114, 37.
131 See, e.g., id. 36; Ruto & Sang Confirmation Decision, supra note 113, 47.
136 See, e.g., Kupre§ki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 88. See also supra Part II.B
pleading principle no. 2.
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(as part of a crime against humanity), but these subsidiary facts were
interpreted by the PTC as material facts constituting the attack, resulting
in the confirmation of charges hearing being adjourned and the
prosecution being sent off to conduct further investigations.1 37 Moreover,
if indeed used to show a pattern or certain features, it raises the question
whether these additional incidents perhaps should have been regarded not
as subsidiary facts, but as a type of similar fact evidence.
The question whether a fact is a material fact, the answer to which
demarcates the case and puts the accused on notice, will therefore be
explored here from two different angles: how are material facts
distinguished from other facts, and how are facts distinguished from
evidence?
A. Subsidiary Facts and Background Information
A closer look at the Gbagbo pre-trial saga reveals how blurred
boundaries between different types of facts and evidence became
entangled with the issue of uncertain case delineation. Laurent Gbagbo,
former President of C6te d'Ivoire, stands accused of four counts of crimes
against humanity in the context of post-electoral violence in his home
country between December 16, 2010 and April 12, 2011. On January 17,
2013, the prosecution filed the DCC identifying four incidents ("charged
incidents") during which the crimes against humanity allegedly had taken
place. In a separate subsection titled "attack against a civilian population"
it described a series of attacks, including the four charged incidents, as
well as 41 other incidents.138 This subsection of the DCC was not placed
under the heading dealing with the actual charges, in which the four
incidents were once again explicitly referred to.
The hearing on the confirmation of charges was held from 19 till
February 28, 2013.139 This hearing is part of the confirmation of charges
process-unique to the ICC and unrelated to the issuance of arrest
warrants-that is used as screening to make sure only persons against
whom a relatively strong case exists are subjected to a trial. 40 On the
basis of the hearing, the PTC will determine whether "there is sufficient
137 See Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2, 44-45.
38 See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-0 1/11-357-Anxl-Red, Document
amendd de notification des charges [DCC], § E.1 (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1545439.pdf [in French only]; see also Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo,
Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11-572, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I of 3 June 2013 entitled "Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation
of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute," 1 (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 1700000.pdf [hereinafter Gbagbo Adjournment Appeal
Judgment].
139 See Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2, 11 (and accompanying footnote 17
for transcripts).
140 See Rome Statute, art. 61. See also Friman et a]., Charges, supra note 5, at 399.
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evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person
committed each of the crimes charged."'14 1 It may then either (1) confirm
the charges and commit the person to trial, after which the case is
transferred to a Trial Chamber, (2) decline to confirm the charges, or (3)
adjourn the hearing and request the prosecutor to either collect more
evidence or amend the charges.'42 In Gbagbo, the PTC adjourned the
hearing on the confirmation of charges on June 3, 2013-this is possible
even though the actual hearing had already taken place.'43 It urged the
prosecution to gather more evidence or conduct further investigations, as
well as provide an updated DCC and a new list of evidence.144 More
specifically, the Chamber stated that none of the 45 discussed incidents,
taken on their own, could establish the existence of an "attack" in the
sense of article 7(2) of the Rome Statute. Even though not all 45 incidents
needed to be proven to the required threshold, as least "a sufficient
number of incidents" must meet the requisite standard of proof. 1
45
Putting aside evidentiary issues relating to a high reliance on NGO
reports and press articles, which in large part caused the judges to remain
unconvinced, the PTC made it clear that it considered all 45 incidents to
be constituting the attack.146 Accordingly, none of these incidents were
considered to be subsidiary facts or background information, and all of
them were treated as being part of the facts and circumstances described
in the charges.
The prosecution's appeal of the PTC's decision claimed a different
intent with respect to the 41 additional (i.e., not-charged) incidents, and
stated that "[the prosecution] also led evidence in relation to another 41
incidents to support evidence from the Charged Incidents that goes to
demonstrating the features of the attack, but in relation to which the
Prosecution did not plead any material facts [.y.1.].,1 It continued by
141 See Rome Statute, art. 61(7).
142 See id. art. 61(7)(a), (b) & (c).
143 See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Combo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-388, Decision
Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 37 (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc638848.pdf; Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2,
13.
144 See Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2, 77 44, 45.
145 See id. 23.
1
46 See id. 36.
147 Gbagbo Prosecution's Appeal, supra note 2, 3. This also follows from the transcripts of
the confirmation of charges hearing. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-
02/11-01/11-T-14-ENG, Transcript of 19 Feb. 19, 2013, at 45.
[T]he Prosecution has selected four incidents that are representative of the
crimes committed by the pro-Gbagbo forces in a sustained series of attacks put
into motion by Mr. Gbagbo during the post-election violence, and during the next
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explaining that "the purpose of the [41 incidents] was to support evidence
from the Charged Incidents that goes to proof of the attacker's pattern of
conduct as well as pattern of victimization."'148 Judge Silvia Fernandez de
Gurmendi sided with the Prosecution in her dissent to the PTC's decision,
adding that the prosecution had made a clear distinction between the
charged allegations and other facts by adding separate sections to the
DCC dealing only with the charges.149 She opined that the subsidiary
facts did not constitute the attack, but "merely serve to prove, together
with all available evidence, the attack and/or its widespread or systematic
nature."
1 50
The Appeals Chamber confirmed the PTC's majority decision. It
noted that the wording of the DCC does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that the prosecution intended to use only the four charged
incidents to establish the attack, and it concluded that the prosecution did
not make a clear enough distinction between the four charged incidents
and the other 41 incidents.151 Moreover, the AC was not convinced that
the distinction between material facts and subsidiary facts was even
warranted here, because the incidents were all separate events. It
explained: "[T]he prosecutor did not present any contextual information
or any other factual allegations that would provide a basis for making
such a distinction, or serve to explain the alleged link between the 41
Incidents and the four Charged Incidents."'52 In other words, in order to
claim to be using facts as subsidiary facts, the prosecution must at least
establish some kind of connection between those facts and the material
facts. Bearing in mind subsidiary facts may also be referred to as
evidentiary facts, this makes a lot of sense: a piece of evidence connects
to an alleged fact.
In Gbagbo, the prosecution seemed to have had two different
intentions with the additional 41 incidents: to use them to demonstrate a
pattern, and to support other evidence that in turn supported the material
facts. These two types of usages, however, do not seem to correspond to
the definition of "subsidiary fact." PTCs have made it clear that in
assessing the prosecution's case at the confirmation stage, subsidiary
facts are only to be considered "as background information or as indirect
proof of the material facts."'153 In other words, these other factual
allegations offer general background information or "indicate
Id.
148 Gbagbo Prosecution's Appeal, supra note 2, 18.
149 See Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2, 35 (Silvia Femd.ndez de Gurmendi,
J., dissenting).
15 0Id. 41.
151 See Gbagbo Adjournment Appeal Judgment, supra note 138, 43, 44.
152 Id. 46.
153 Banda & Jerbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 114, 37.
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intermediate steps in the prosecution's chain of reasoning."1 54 Moreover,
"subsidiary facts [ . .] are of relevance only to the extent that facts
described in the charges may be inferred from them."'155 As the AC noted
in Gbagbo, a link between the subsidiary facts and the material facts must
be discernible.
Other information (i.e., non-essential information or subsidiary facts)
indeed seem to have a dual function at the ICC: (1) it may provide a
narrative intended to enhance understanding of the alleged events, and
(2) it may be used to infer the existence of material facts. Conflating the
term "subsidiary" on the one hand and "background information" on the
other is likely to cause confusion, though, despite they are indeed linked.
While subsidiary facts may lead to a greater understanding of the
prosecution's theory of the case, they do not necessarily serve the
(exclusive) purpose of providing background information. Strictly
speaking, they are intended to demonstrate or support the existence of the
facts underlying the charges, in other words the material facts. In a way,
they provide a narrative of what factually happened, and act as glue
connecting the evidence with the material facts, which indeed provides a
background. To illustrate, take a single murder as example. The material
facts are likely to be: (1) the victim was killed, (2) the accused did the act
that killed the victim, and (3) the accused intended to kill the victim. A
subsidiary fact could be, for instance, that the accused was seen beating
the victim on the same day the killing took place. That subsidiary fact-
which naturally in itself should be supported by evidence, but that taken
on its own does not constitute a material fact in a murder case-in turn
aids to prove the material fact, creating a chain of reasoning that paints
the full factual picture of the prosecution's case.
The Gbagbo Pre-Trial Chamber, reiterating the importance of factual
and legal demarcation at the confirmation stage, argued for a clear
distinction between the facts and circumstances underlying the charges
(material facts) and other factual allegations supporting the existence of
the material facts (subsidiary facts). '5 It also emphasized that subsidiary
154 Prosecutor v. Muthaura & Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-536, Order regarding the
content of the charges, 13 (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl 510847.pdf.
See also Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 2, 34 n.39 (Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi,
J., dissenting), where Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi observed that "facts of a subsidiary
nature will usually emerge from 'circumstantial evidence."' While not clarifying the distinction
between material and subsidiary facts any further, the AC has endorsed the use of the term
'subsidiary facts' on several occasions: see Lubanga Regulation 55 Decision, supra note 116,
90 n.163; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, Judgment on the
appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of Nov. 12, 2012 entitled
"Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing
the charges against the accused persons," 50 (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1573822.pdf; Gbagbo Adjournment Appeal Judgment, supra note 138, 37.
155 Ruto & Sang Confirmation Decision, supra note 113, 47.
156 See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11-325, Decision on the date
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facts are not part of the charges and are therefore not subject to the
confirmation of charges process. Judge Christine van den Wyngaert
articulated a logical conclusion of such reasoning in a separate opinion to
a decision in Muthaura & Kenyatta where the Majority explicitly
authorized the prosecution to keep other factual allegations (considered
to be background information or other information of a subsidiary nature)
in the updated DCC.157 She disagreed with including subsidiary facts in
a DCC altogether. She argued that the DCC should only contain the
material facts, and should not include any unnecessary background
information or subsidiary facts. The correct place for such information is
the pre-trial brief.158 She pointed out that the DCC has a very specific and
fundamental purpose: it demarcates the case legally and factually, while
the pre-trial brief tells the defense how the prosecution intends to plead
the case. It is therefore imperative that the facts and circumstances
contained in the DCC are "clear, precise, and unambiguous."'159 Allowing
both material facts and subsidiary facts in a DCC complicates matters
needlessly, and turns a DCC into a dual-functioning hybrid between a
charging instrument and a pre-trial brief.'
60
Indeed, keeping subsidiary facts out of the charging instrument
delimits the case more clearly, and reduces any potential confusion as to
which facts are material. But it is possible to imagine exceptions to this
rule. At the ICTY, for instance, while there is limited case law dealing
with the issues surrounding evidentiary or subsidiary facts in general,
Trial Chambers have held-this is pleading principle no. 9 discussed in
Part II.B-that where the state of mind of the accused is relevant to the
charges, the prosecution must plead in the indictment either (1) the
specific state of mind as a material fact (in which case the facts by which
that material fact is to be established are ordinary matters of evidence and
need not be pleaded further); or (2) the evidentiary facts-the term used
at the ICTY for subsidiary facts-from which the state of mind is to be
inferred.16 1 This has only been held with respect to mens rea as an
exception to having to plead all the material facts explicitly, and nothing
similar has been dealt with at the ICC. This is a very logical exemption,
of the confirmation of charges hearing and proceedings leading thereto, 27 (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc l528879.pdf.
157 See Prosecutor v. Muthaura & Kenyatta, Case no. ICC-01/09-02/11-584, Decision on the
content of the updated document containing the charges, 13 (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 1532400.pdf.
158 Id. 3 (Christine van den Wyngaert, J., separate opinion).
159 Id. 4 (Christine van den Wyngaert, J., separate opinion).
160 Id. 5 (Christine van den Wyngaert, J., separate opinion).
161 See Stanigid & 7upljanin Decision, supra note 71, 16; Mrkgid Indictment Decision,
supra note 74, $ 11; Blaski6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 72, 219; see also Prosecutor v.
Ayyash, Case No. STL-1 1-01/PT/TC, Decision on Alleged Defects in the Form of the Amended
Indictment, 58 (June 12, 2013), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/main/filings/
orders-and-decisions/trial-chamber/f0952.
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though, one that perhaps may be transplanted to the ICC. The state of
mind of an accused is not likely directly observable and will almost
always need to be inferred from other facts.
Looking at the definition of subsidiary facts, and how they are only
found in the indictments at the ad hoc Tribunals by way of a narrow
exception, the question arises whether in Gbagbo the 41 incidents were
supposed to have been used as subsidiary facts, material facts, or as
something else. If they were included to support the material facts, for
instance the attack, they may be considered subsidiary facts. If this had
been crystal clear, it may even not have been that detrimental to have
them in the DCC, because confusion was likely avoided. If they were
indeed crucial to, or part of, the attack, they may be regarded as material
facts and must form part of the charges. If the additional incidents were
not as such directly linked to the primary charged incidents, namely the
attack, but were used to show a pattern, they may be a type of similar fact
evidence, in which case they should not have been in the DCC as it would
have been a matter of proof.
B. Between Proof and Pleading: Patterns of Conduct and Similar
Fact Evidence
In the June 2013 Gbagbo Decision, the PTC pulled the other 41
incidents into the realm of material facts, which need to be proven to the
required standard of proof. This did not lead to the factual parameters of
the case drastically changing, though. Still speaking of four charged
incidents (during which four counts of crimes against humanity-rape,
murder, other inhumane acts or attempted murder, and persecution-
were allegedly committed), the PTC eventually confirmed the charges on
June 12, 2014, after the prosecution had gathered more evidence as it had
been directed to do.162 Other acts were mentioned in the Confirmation of
Charges Decision as well, but their exact purpose remained
ambiguous.163 They were not part of the four charged incidents during
which the four counts of crimes against humanity took place; some acts
were used to show a pattern,'64 while in relation to other acts the Chamber
merely stated it took "note of the evidence establishing that the following
events took place."
' 165
The prosecution in this case had stated earlier that it intended to use
the other not-charged incidents not as material facts as such nor to support
162 See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/I 1-01/11-656-Red, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, 267-77 (June 12, 2014), http://www.icc-
cpi.intlicc docs/doc/doc I783399.pdf.
163 See id. 73-77.
'64 Id. 75.165 Id. 77.
[Vol. 27
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the material facts, but to support the evidence underlying the material
facts in relation to proof of the accused's pattern of conduct and the
pattern of victimization.'1 66 This does not seem to adhere to the definition
of subsidiary facts, which are used to prove material facts, not to support
the underlying evidence. The ensuing decision confirming the charges
did not touch upon this subject, but the use of the word "incident" was
perhaps unfortunate, too. The definition of crimes against humanity does
not speak of "incidents;" it only demands the commission of multiple
acts.67 In this case, one incident already encompassed a plurality of acts,
and moreover, one incident did not correspond one-on-one to one count
of a crime against humanity. In any event, matters got very confused, but
strangely, none of the actors involved suggested that all of this might have
been a misinterpretation of pattern of conduct evidence, despite its
similarities and hints in that direction.
In international crime cases, information about other events or acts not
charged in the indictment is often introduced to demonstrate a certain
pattern. For a series of acts or incidents to be qualified as a pattern, they
must show common features of, for instance, the perpetrator, the victims
or the modus operandi. 168 Pattern evidence, often equated with the notion
of "similar fact evidence" or "evidence of similar conduct," is a well-
known phrase from common law systems and it is also used at the ad hoc
Tribunals. It may be further defined as evidence of crimes not alleged in
the indictment, but nevertheless used to establish guilt for the acts with
which the accused is charged.169 Such type of evidence, also known as
character evidence, is generally inadmissible where it goes to show the
accused's propensity or disposition to do the type of acts charged and is
therefore guilty of the crime in the indictment.170 Moreover, in relation to
international crimes evidence relating to the accused's character is
considered to have very little probative value: the nature of international
crimes, which take place during a national or international emergency, is
166 See supra Part III.A.
167 See Rome Statute art. 7(2)(a): "'Attack directed against any civilian population' means a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph I against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack."
168 See Xabier Agirre Aranburu, Sexual Violence: Using Pattern Evidence and Analysis for
International Cases, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 609, 610 (2010).
169 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE 790 (2010) [hereinafter SCHABAS COMMENTARY].
170 See Prosecutor v. Kupre~kid, Case No. IT-95-16, Decision on Evidence of the Good
Character of the Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque, § 4 (Feb. 17, 1999), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tdec/en/90217MS25407.htm [hereinafter Kupreiki& Tu
Quoque Decision]; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Admissibility
of Proposed Testimony of Witness DBY, 12 (Sept. 18, 2003), http://41.220.139.198/Portals/0/
Case/English/Bagosora/Trail%20and%2OAppeal/180903.pdf [hereinafter Bagosora DBY
Decision].
37
Fry: International Crimes and Case Demarcation: What Are We Trying to
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
such that they are often committed by persons with no prior convictions
or history of violence.
171
Pattern evidence can be quite prejudicial to the defense, and it
potentially erodes the presumption of innocence.172 Under certain
circumstances it may be admissible, though. The RPEs of the ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL share the same Rule 93 dealing with this type of
evidence, providing that it may be admissible in the interests of1justice)73
The ICTY AC has endorsed using this evidentiary method pointing out
that:
[U]nder the so-called principle of "similar fact evidence", courts
in England and Wales, Australia and the United States admit
evidence of crimes or wrongful acts committed by the defendant
other than those charged in the indictment, if the other crimes are
introduced to demonstrate a special knowledge, opportunity, or
identification of the defendant that would make it more likely that
he committed the instant crime as well. 1
74
The admission of such evidence always requires respecting and
balancing the rights of the accused. Although comprised of professional
judges and not juries, Chambers ought not be distracted by hearing
endless testimony on irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, as this may
cause the trial to lose focus and be unduly lengthened.
75
There are a number of international cases in which similar fact
evidence was used. For example, in Gali6, similar fact evidence with
respect to an additional (not-charged) sniping incident was admitted, as
it corroborated the accused's consistent pattern of conduct in relation to
the charged sniping incidents.'76 In Kvodka et al., similar fact evidence
was admitted against two accused. One woman's testimony relating to
171 See Kupregki6 Tu Quoque Decision, supra note 170, § 4. See also Alette Smeulers et al.,
Sixty-Five Years of International Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures, in THE REALITIES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7, 34 (D.L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013).
172 See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 169, at 791.
173 See ICTY/R RPEs & SCSL RPE, r.93(A); RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 105-06 (2002); Prosecutor v. Ngeze & Nahimana, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, D6cision sur les appels interlocutoires, 20 (Sept. 5, 2000) (Shahabuddeen, J.,
separate opinion), available at http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx-ltpdb/doc906823_02.pdf.
174 Kupregki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 321.
171 Bagosora DBY Decision, supra note 170, 28; see also Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case
No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Evidence Tendered Through Witness K82, 19 (Oct. 3, 2006),
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/061003.pdf.
176 See Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Decision on the Motion for the Entry of
Acquittal of the Accused Stanislav Gali, 3 n.1 (Oct. 3, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
galic/tjug/en/021003.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gali, Case No. IT-98-29-PT, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Indicating that the First and Second Schedule to the Indictment Dated Oct. 10, 2001
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Mlado Radi6, who encouraged a guard to have sex with the witness in
exchange for a meeting with her husband, was admitted into evidence
under Rule 93(A) ICTY RPE,177 as well as a second testimony relating to
a witness's actual rape by Radi6.178 The other accused in this case, Zoran
Zigi6, also had similar fact evidence admitted against him in relation to a
number of assaults of which the victims were not listed on the Amended
Indictment or Schedules.'79 Also, in Popovi6 et al., evidence relating to
the Bigina execution site, which did not form part of the indictment, was
admitted into evidence, because it was nevertheless "still relevant and
highly probative as to [Popovi's] knowledge, intent and "pattern of
conduct" during the relevant time period, particularly in relation to the
alleged joint criminal enterprise to murder the able bodied Bosnian
Muslim men."
' 80
In Bagosora et al., the leading decision in this respect, the ICTR TC
discussed a number of ways in which similar fact evidence may be used,
relying mostly on the often-cited separate opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen to a decision from Ngeze & Nahimana. The context of the
former decision was dealing with extra-temporal evidence in light of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction. Such extra-temporal evidence from before 1994,
the year from which the Tribunal's mandate allows it to exercise
jurisdiction, is generally inadmissible at the ICTR bar three exceptions:
(1) evidence relevant to an offence continuing into 1994; (2) evidence
providing a context or background; and (3) similar fact evidence.'8' With
respect to similar fact evidence, the Bagosora TC held that the rule must
be understood from the perspective of the general principle that evidence
regarding the character of the accused is not admissible if that evidence
is only introduced to blacken the accused's reputation by showing that he
or she committed the same crime before, is inclined to commit the crime
or is capable of committing the crime.1 82 Similar fact evidence is
admissible, however, when it serves "to prove a pattern, design or
systematic course of conduct by the accused where his explanation on the
basis of coincidence would be an affront to common sense."'183 Thus, for
177 See Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 547 (Nov. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tjOl 1002e.pdf.
1781 Id. 7 556.
179 Id. 7 652, 663, 664.
180 05-88-T, Decision on Motion to Reopen the Prosecution Case, TT 33, 39 (May 9, 2008),
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/080509.pdf.
"I See Bagosora DBY Decision, supra note 170, 7 9-14; Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No.
ICTR-01-76-1, Decision on Defence Motion to Preclude Prosecution Evidence, 3 (Aug. 31,
2004), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Simba/decisions/310804.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Nzuwonemeye's Motion to Exclude Parts
of Witness AOG's Testimony, 22 (Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/
English/Ndindiliyimana/decisions/300306.pdf.
182 Bagosora DBY Decision, supra note 170, 12.
183Id. T 13.
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similar fact evidence to be admissible it must show more than a mere
propensity to commit the crime; it must be "probative of some peculiar
feature of the case which substantially enhances its probative value in
relation to the charge."'184 Judges will need to assess whether the evidence
serves such a specific goal on a case-by-case basis keeping in mind the
evidence should not be unfairly prejudicial towards the accused.'1
5
The ICC has thus far remained silent with respect to the phrase
"similar fact evidence" and there is no mention of pattern evidence in the
Rome Statute or RPE. In fact, Rule 93 of the ad hoc Tribunals' RPEs is
the only original evidentiary rule that was not included in the ICC's
equivalent.186 However, there have been cases where patterns played a
prominent role. One commentator noted the connection with pattern
evidence when he discussed the use of evidence of other (not charged)
attacks in Katanga & Ngudjolo with respect to context.187 Indeed, in that
case, under the heading Theory of similar events: mode of proof by
analogy, the Pre-Trial Chamber allowed evidence regarding other attacks
than the charged attack (which had taken place in the town Bogoro in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) in order to establish the overall
context of the conflict. Referring to the Lubanga Confirmation of
Charges Decision, the PTC held that "providing evidence which may
assist [the Chamber] in establishing the overall context in which the
crimes are alleged to have occurred is not only helpful to its
understanding of the evidence supporting the charges but is also highly
relevant and probative in respect of the contextual elements of the crimes
under articles 7 and 8 of the Statute."'88 It must be assumed from the
wording of the Chamber that the only type of context the evidence was
used for were the contextual elements in the crime definitions, which are
every bit a part of the material facts as the other legal elements of the
crimes.'89 However, once again, this was not exactly what the prosecution
had had in mind. They had submitted that evidence of other attacks was
also probative regarding the suspects' intent and knowledge.190 In a later
submission, the prosecution linked this evidence to the doctrine of
"similar fact evidence" referring to the ICTY and ICTR case law, 191 but
184 Id. 14.
185 Id.
186 See Christopher Gosnell, Admissibility of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 375, 431 (Karim A.A. Khan et al. eds., 2010).
187 Id.
88 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-
717, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 228 (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf [hereinafter Katanga & Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision].
189 See supra Part III.A.
10 See Katanga & Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision, supra note 188, 226.
191 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07-1645, Prosecution's Consolidated Response to "Defence Objections to Admissibility in
Principal and in Substance" (ICC-01/04-01-07-1558) and Requ~te de la Defense en vue d'obtenir
(Vol. 27
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unfortunately, ICC Chambers have never clarified matters as they never
used this terminology themselves nor devoted any substantial
consideration to the notion.
With respect to the use of patterns at the ICC, it is also worth noting
the dissenting opinion of Judge Anita Ugacka to the Lubanga Appeal
Judgment. She observed that the charges-the war crimes of enlisting and
conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to
participate actively in hostilities-were divided into a "pattern" section
and "individual cases" section, causing confusion as to the relationship
between the two. Also, the evidence relating to the individual cases was,
unforeseeably, rejected by the Trial Chamber only at the end of trial,
leaving the "vague formulations" of the pattern charges as the basis for
the conviction.192 In Judge Ugacka's view, the pattern charges merely
provided contextual or background information, incapable of adequately
informing the accused of the charges. Moreover, by having to rely on the
pattern charges after the evidence regarding the individual cases was
thrown out, the Prosecutor effectively was forced to reclassify the
individual cases from "core factual allegations underlying the charges" to
evidence, or in the words of the Prosecutor, as "sample episodes chosen
as evidence."'93 While sampling of data-meaning, in general terms, the
process of(1) selecting units such as people, organizations or events from
a population or pool of interest, (2) studying the sample in order to (3)
generalize the results back to the population or pool from which they were
chosen-as method of investigating crime patterns is beyond the scope
of this Article, sampling of incidents is a common technique for building
a case in the legal sense at the international courts and tribunals. As one
senior investigator pointed out, "[i]ncidents are chosen in a way like 'case
studies' as representative of the overall pattern."194 Especially in
international crime cases, patterns often play a role since most cases
involve a large number of incidents.9 5 Key in this respect is making a
clear distinction between (material and subsidiary/evidentiary) facts and
(pattern of conduct) evidence. While the former are found in the charging
instrument when deemed material or, if one follows ICTY case law, when
used as evidentiary facts to establish mens rea, the latter are matters of
proof and are therefore not found in the indictment. If parties are clear on
une decision d'irrecevabilit6 des documents lids aux t~moins d~c~d~s r~fdrenc~s sous les numdros
T-167 et T-258 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1556), 65-66 n.68 (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/ic cdocs/doc/doc781779.pdf
192 See Lubanga Appeal Judgment, supra note 111, 12 (Anita Ugacka, J., dissenting).
"I Id. 18 (Anita Ugacka, J., dissenting); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04--01/06-2969-Red, Prosecution's Response to Thomas Lubnaga's Appeal Against
Trial Chamber I's Judgment Pursuant to Article 74, 104 (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl 555036.pdf
194 See Aranburu, supra note 168, at 620.
195 Id.
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how they intend to use different facts and evidence at their disposal, the
types of evidence discussed in this section do not influence case
demarcation in the strict sense, meaning when taking the charging
instrument as the foundation of demarcation. It does, however, have an
effect on the scope of the case in a broader sense. Additional incidents,
although not charged, factually widen the amount of issues dealt with at
trial, and therefore inevitably affect the interests of the accused with
respect to the length of trial and the disclosure of evidence. However, as
elaborated upon ext, this is usually a different matter than the right of
the accused to be given notice of the nature and cause of the charge
against him or her, which relates to the charging instrument.
IV. THE SPECIFICITY OF CHARGES AND THE RIGHT TO BE
PUT ON NOTICE
The purpose of the charging instrument or indictment is to fix the
factual and legal parameters of the case at trial and to inform the accused
about the charges.196 Vague charges and conflation of subsidiary and
material facts, and facts and evidence corrode these fundamental goals
and have a dire effect on the rights of the defense. Both parts of the
charging instrument's dual function express a number of essential fair
trial rights. This includes the fundamental principle to be presumed
innocent when charged with a criminal offense and granting adequate
opportunity to prepare a defense,197 as well as safeguarding the ne bis in
idem principle (protection from repeated charges of the same offense,
also known as the double jeopardy protection).198 The fair trial rights at
play here comprise the normative boundaries in light of this Article's
main query: lack of specific case demarcation finds its limits in the rights
of the accused to be given fair notice of the charges against him or her,
discussed in Part IV.A, and to be protected against subsequent charges of
the same crime, discussed in Part IV.B.
A. Notice: Preparing a Defense
Defense complaints relating to the vagueness of charges are
commonly heard at the international criminal courts and tribunals.
99
Such objections are based on the right of the accused to be informed of
the case against him or her.2 °° The ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL statutes
196 See Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 383.
197 See, e.g., Jordash & Martin, supra note 97, at 588; Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5,
at 454.
198 Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 436-37.
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all follow the major international human rights instruments-the ICC and
ECCC do as well, but use slightly different language-in guaranteeing
that an accused will "be informed promptly and in detail in a language
which he or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against
him or her." '' The nature of the charge translates as the legal
qualification and the cause of the charge as the underlying material
facts,2 2 both of which the accused must be made aware of. 203 It has been
observed by the European Court of Human Rights that "in criminal
matters the provision of full, detailed information concerning the charges
against a defendant, and consequently the legal characterization that the
court might adopt in the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring
that the proceedings are fair."204 The accused's right to be informed, or
in other words, to be put on notice enables preparing an effective defense,
which is the touchstone criterion in relation to sufficient specificity of
charges.20 5 Moreover, it relates closely to the right to have adequate time
and facilities for the preparation of the defense, and already encompasses
the right to have information translated into a language the accused
understands. Obviously, an effective defense starts with knowing in detail
what one is being accused of, and consequently, these rights also apply
to any amendments to charges.
206
Because the ultimate objective of these fair trial provisions is allowing
an effective defense, which is a notoriously subjective notion, the
assessment whether an accused has received sufficient notice is
inherently one that must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Allowing
special features to be taken into consideration in this respect does not
deviate from international human rights standards per se.207 As previously
noted, the Kupregki6 AC held that the massive scale of international
crimes might justify a lower degree of specificity, which in and of itself
is not unreasonable. However, especially in the early days of the ad hoc
Tribunals, it opened the door to using this claim of "uniqueness" as an
excuse for "loose drafting, less particularization, and less rigorous
201 Id.; ICTR Statute, art. 20(4)(a); SCSL Statute, art. 17(4)(a); STL Statute, art. 16(4)(a).
See also Rome Statute, art. 67(1)(a); ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 50, r.21(1)(d).
202 See, e.g., Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62, 29.
203 See PMlissier & Sassi v. France, App. No. 25444/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), 52.
204 Id.
205 See Bla~kic Defects Decision, supra note 58, 32. See also Wayne Jordash & John
Coughlan, The Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Charges: A Potentially
Formidable Jurisprudential Legacy, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS 286, 289 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010).
206 See, e.g., Mattoccia v. Italy, App. No. 23969/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), 59-61.
207 See, e.g., Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 12244/86; 12245/86;
12383/86, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990), 40 (observing that "[w]hether the content and promptness of
the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special
features.").
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scrutiny of indictments."20 8 Fortunately, this tendency has changed, and
recent case law at the ICTY and ICTR shows adequate charging standards
consistent with international human rights law.20 9 At the ICC, the practice
of the ICTY and ICTR is largely followed, too.2 10 The SCSL's practice
remained problematic though. Commentators have noted that the concise
charging instrument supplemented with a case summary fell short of
international standards.
211
The idea that the nature of international crimes leaves prosecutors
with unparalleled challenges has at times inspired a search for creative
solutions outside of indictment requirements. For instance, in
Ntakirutimana at the ICTR, the Trial Chamber allowed indictment
defects to be cured through disclosure of evidence, holding that it depends
on the circumstances of the case and as long as this is done before the
commencement of trial. To be more specific, one of the indictments was
found to lack specificity, but the pre-trial brief included eighty witness
statements of the witnesses who would be called to testify at trial. This
additional information was submitted one month before trial, and the
Chamber held that this was most indicative of the material facts of the
case.2 12 Thus, where there had been sufficient notice to the accused
through pre-trial disclosure of evidence, charges were not dismissed. This
is controversial. In another case, a different ICTR Trial Chamber refused
to allow other submitted information to so easily cure defects in the
indictment: it held that all material facts must be properly pleaded in the
indictment and pre-trial submissions and disclosure are not adequate
substitutes.213 If a paragraph in the indictment is indeed defective, the
Chamber continued, it could be disregarded.214 This does not mean,
however, that the Chamber cannot take the evidence supporting said
paragraph into consideration.215 Moreover, referring to Kupre§ki6, the
Chamber noted it "might understandably be reluctant to allow a defect in
the form of the indictment to determine finally the outcome of a case in
which there is strong evidence pointing towards the guilt of the
208 Jordash & Coughlan, supra note 205, at 289.
209 See Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 456.
2 10 See supra Part Il.
211 See, e.g., Jordash & Martin, supra note 97; Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 456.
212 See Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Cases No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-
17-T, Judgment and Sentence, 9 63 (Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/
English/Elizaphan/index.pdf. The judgment and sentence were upheld on appeal. However, some
factual finding by the Trial Chamber were quashed because they were not in the indictment,
making it defective, and this was not remedied for the facts were not specified in the Pre-Trial
brief or witness statements. See Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 65, % 86, 99, 289,
555.
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accused.,216 In other words, in exceptional instances solutions may
indeed be found through other avenues as long as a balance is struck.
Underscoring the case-by-case nature of the assessment, it held that "[i] f
strong evidence of guilt is found to exist, the Chamber will take into
consideration to what extent the lack of notice and the ambiguity
influenced the evidence and will adjust its findings if necessary."
217
The right to be put on notice and its attached rights relate primarily to
the charging instrument, which should contain all the material facts.
However, at the ad hoc Tribunals, a narrow exception exists that allows
disclosed evidence or other information (such as a pre-trial brief) to have
a curing effect on an otherwise defective indictment (i.e., one that lacks
specificity). This exception can only be allowed when the accused is
given "timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis
underpinning the charges."218 This exception is far from ideal and should
be avoided whenever possible. It is highly problematic to require from
the defense that it sift through large amounts of disclosures in order to
ascertain which facts may underpin the charges, especially when such
information is not made available until the eve of trial.219 Moreover, "in
light of the factual and legal complexities normally associated with
[international] crimes" the number of cases in which indictment defects
may be cured through such means is extremely limited.22°
Until recently, it was not clear whether the ICC allowed a curing effect
by other document s in the same way as at the ad hoc Tribunals.
221
Commentators even thought the ICC's Approach might turn out to be
stricter.22 2 As a general rule, the DCC must be read in conjunction with
the prosecution's list of evidence.223 This means that when items on this
list can remedy a certain amount of ambiguity in the DCC, a defense's
claim that the DCC is too vague has no merit.2 24 Both documents are
provided simultaneously, which arguably, makes it rather unproblematic
if the list can remedy a certain degree of vagueness. However, in the
Lubanga Appeal Judgment, the Appeals Chamber seemed to have opened
the door to a worrisome practice. It reiterated the importance of the
prosecution's list of evidence in remedying vagueness of charges, but
216 Id. 68 (citing Kupregkik Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 125).
217 I'd.
218 Kupreikid Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 114. See also Blakid Appeal Judgment,
supra note 72, 237; Fofana & Kondewa, AC, SCSL, May 28, 2008, 443; Ntakirutimana Appeal
Judgment, supra note 65, 125.
219 See Ntagerura Trial Judgment, supra note 62, 66.
221 See Kupretki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 114.
221 Cf Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 118, 207. See also Friman et al., Charges,
supra note 5, at 423.
222 See Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 423.
223 See Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 118, 150.
224 See Katanga & Ngudjolo Decision on Defences' Motions, supra note 110, 25.
45
Fry: International Crimes and Case Demarcation: What Are We Trying to
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W
added "other auxiliary documents" to the list of possible curing items.225
It found that "all documents that were designed to provide information
about the charges, including auxiliary documents, must be considered to
determine whether an accused was informed in sufficient detail of the
charges.226 The Appeals Chamber then continued by adding a couple of
conditions, namely: (i) this relates only to information made available
before the start of the trial hearings,227 and (ii) "where submissions by the
Prosecutor made in advance of the trial hearings related to the factual
allegations provide additional detail, this can be taken into account when
determining whether the accused's right to be information in detail of the
charges has been violated.,228 In the case at hand, the Appeals Chamber
referred, in additional to the DCC, to the Amended DCC and the
Summary of Evidence,229 but this second prerequisite theoretically adds
a very wide range of documents capable of curing defective indictments.
B. Ne bis in idem
An often neglected yet related issue in relation to the importance of
indictment specificity is the protection against double jeopardy. In
common law, preventing multiple jeopardy for the same crime, also
known as the ne bis in idem principle, is a function of indictments given
substantial attention. In Hagner, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that:
[t]he true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it
could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it
contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged "and
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to
meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for
a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what
extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.
'" 230
Protection against double jeopardy may be regarded as the basis of the
prerequisite that the pleading sets forth the essential elements of the
crime, and that it provide sufficient specificity as to the underlying
facts.2 31 It is a principle found in nearly every system-national, regional
and international-in the world.232 Ne bis in idem literally means "not







230 Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932).
231 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 915-16 (5th ed 2009).
232 See Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 471-77, 482.
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twice for the same." The principle's details vary per system, but in most
national systems "the same" entails a factual approach (the historical facts
and conduct) as opposed to a legal approach (a particular criminal
offense, which offers narrower protection).233
Due to the relationship international criminal courts and tribunals
have with states, double jeopardy plays a role in different ways that are
"trans-jurisdictional" or "transnational,'' 234  and which may be
characterized as downward and upward vertical ne bis in idem (i.e.,
externally between national and international systems), as opposed to
horizontal (i.e., internally within one national or international system). As
Article 10 of the ICTY Statute and Article 9 of the ICTR Statute say: "no
person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious
violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for
which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal. 235
Such downward vertical double jeopardy protection is absolute. While
some commentators have suggested it is not clear whether it entails a
factual or a legal approach, most seem to agree that idem is to be
understood as 'same offense,' making it a legal approach.236 Upward
vertical double jeopardy protection is not absolute. The ICTY, ICTR and
SCSL may try a person already tried by a national court (1) in case the
person was tried for an act characterized as an ordinary crime, or (2) when
the national proceedings were not impartial or independent, were
designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility,
or the case was not diligently prosecuted.237 Only the second exception
applies to the STL.2 38 The ordinary crime exception with upward ne bis
in idem underscores that the conduct's legal qualification is indeed
relevant, making it a legal approach. The statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals
do not include horizontal ne bis in idem provisions, probably because the
drafters found the occurrence of a retrial at the same tribunal very
unlikely.
239
At the ICC, the ne bis in idem provision in Article 20 of the Statute
233 Id. at 475-76. See generally Gerard Conway, Ne Bis In Idem in International Law, 3 INT'L
CdM. L. REV. 217 (2003); WIENE FRANCINE VAN HATrUM, NON BIS IN IDEM: DE ONTWIKKELING
VAN EEN BEGINSEL (2012).
234 Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 482.
235 The statutes of the SCSL and STL only prohibit Sierra Leonean and Lebanese courts from
trying persons already tried by these international tribunals, because their founding agreements
do not bind other states than Sierra Leone and Lebanon. See SCSL Statute, art. 9(1), STL Statute,
art. 5(1). See also Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Dustin A. Lewis, Jurisdictional Arrangements and
International Criminal Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND
RULES 116, 121 (G6ran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013).
236 See Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 440.
237 See ICTY Statute, art. 10(2)(a)-(b); ICTR Statute, art. 9(2)(a)-(b); SCSL Statute, art.
9(2)(a)-(b). See also ICTY/R RPEs, r. 13.
238 See STL Statute, art. 5(2).
239 See Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 439.
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must be read in light of the principle of complementarity. Pursuant to
Article 20(3), which mirrors Article 17 of the ICC Statute that deals with
admissibility of cases and provides the division of labor between the ICC
and national jurisdictions, no person who has been tried by another court
for conduct also proscribed under Articles 6, 7, or 8 shall be tried by the
ICC with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other
court were (1) for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(2) otherwise not conducted independently or impartially in accordance
with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.240 This upward vertical
ne bis in idem entails a factual approach, which means that it does not
matter whether the national court qualified the conduct as an ordinary
crime or not. In other words, the ICC Statute, like the STL Statute, does
not contain the "ordinary crime" exception like the statutes of the other
Tribunals do.24 1 The downward vertical ne bis in idem specified in Article
20(2) entails a legal approach, though, which means that national courts
are free to try crimes outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. Another
difference with the ad hoc Tribunals is that the ICC includes an internal,
horizontal ne bis in idem provision in Article 20(1), which employs a
factual approach.242
The ne bis in idem principle expresses "the uniqueness of the criminal
trial., 243 The principle's inclusion here is necessary, because-similar to
the right to prepare an effective defense-it is a tool that helps determine
how specific a case must be delineated. This is especially so when a
factual approach to double jeopardy is applicable. While offering more
protection than the legal approach, the factual approach "typically
encounters significant problems in determining the precise limits of the
object of a trial. 244 This provides all the more reason to be as specific as
possible from the beginning. When drafting indictments, a useful
hypothetical question would be how it would stand under the ne bis in
idem principle test. If repeated charges are easily conceivable, the
indictment is too vague under the specificity of charges principle.
240 See Rome Statute, art. 20(3).
241 Cf id. ("with respect to the same conduct"). See also Prosecutor v. Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-0 1/11-01/11-344-Red, Decision on the admissibility of the case against
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 86 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 1599 307.pdf.
242 See generally Friman et al., Charges, supra note 5, at 442-45.
24 3
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V. CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of international criminal courts and (military)
tribunals, the complex nature of international crimes has been stated as
reason to forgive lowering standards of specificity of charges. From the
Control Council Law No. 10 Justice judgment to contemporary ICTY,
ICTR, SCSL, and ICC decisions, judges have expressed the idea that with
crimes of "cataclysmic dimensions"245 the prosecution "cannot be
obliged to perform the impossible,"246 and requiring a high degree of
indictment specificity is "impracticable."247 Indeed, the factual
parameters of international crime cases are not easily set, and a
prosecutor's perspective in this is easily sympathized with. The
challenges are undoubtedly tremendous. In practice, however, this has led
to vague indictments. This is not only due to a lack of factual specificity.
It is also caused by evidentiary imprecision-conflating material facts
and subsidiary/evidentiary facts on the one hand, and facts and (pattern)
evidence on the other.
While allowing exceptions to specificity based on international
crimes' uniqueness is most certainly not without merit, it finds its limit
in the 10 general pleading principles and related fair trial rights discussed
in this Article. Accordingly, the effect of international crimes' massive
scale on their prosecution should be left to a minimum. This corresponds
with how case law developed over the past two decades. While the early
post-World War II judgments showed much more leniency in respect of
scale-related prosecutorial challenges, the contemporary cases have been
faced with much higher demands. The argument that the nature of
international crimes pardons a lower degree of specificity of charges has
slowly been losing ground, and the "unique nature" argument therefore
no longer carries as far as it once did.
The rights of the accused comprise the normative boundaries of how
unspecific charges are allowed to be and how much confusion of facts
and evidence is remediable fairly. They form a two-prong test in this
respect: (1) is the accused in a position to prepare an effective defense,
and (2) can a double jeopardy assessment be made? These two questions
are to be kept in mind when applying the 10 pleading principles as well
as when making a distinction between different types of facts evidence,
for tolerating erosion of the rights of the accused in deference of
perceived challenges is not the way to go. If something needs to give due
to the challenging nature of the crime, it should not be the rights of the
accused. Rather, answers should be sought in prosecutorial methods of
framing the case, which goes back to the investigation stage of the
245 Sesay Indictment Decision, supra note 70, 23.
246 Brdanin & Talid Decision on Objections by Talid, supra note 62, 22.
247 Kupregki6 Appeal Judgment, supra note 61, 89.
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proceedings.
Admittedly, international crimes' complexities and associated
evidentiary challenges, as described by, amongst others, Nancy Combs
in her book Fact-Finding without Facts,248 lead to unparalleled fact-
finding impediments. There is indeed a certain amount of uniqueness to
proving international crimes, but where fact-finding becomes so
challenging that it lacks adequate precision, this will be reflected in the
indictment and throughout the presentation of evidence during trial. This
in turn affects the rights of the accused to be sufficiently informed of the
charges. In other words, a well-defined indictment must be preceded by
precise fact-finding; if the latter lacks accuracy, the charging document
will inevitably be vague, too. The link between available evidence
through adequate fact-finding and indictment specificity was already
illustrated very early on by Einsatzgruppen.249 The Einsatzgruppen
indictment had reached its high level of specificity because most of the
evidence came from elaborate previous testimony by defendant Otto
Ohlendorf in the IMT trial where he had testified as a witness.
International crime cases still suffer from vague charges and
imprecise categorization of facts and evidence too often, resulting in
ambiguous case demarcation to the detriment of the accused. This
unwanted result is usually approached from the perspective of specificity
of charges, which indeed sets the factual and legal boundaries of a case
at trial and puts the accused on notice. An understudied topic thus far,
however, has been the use of facts and evidence in this respect. This
Article has shown that all parties, but most importantly prosecutors and
judges, need to be much clearer and more explicit in how they use and
characterize different types facts, pattern evidence, and evidence of
similar conduct. While seemingly simple in theory, such distinctions are
notoriously complicated to make in practice. This kind of confusion not
only hurts the prosecution, but also violates the rights of the accused as it
renders the question of what it is we are trying to prove without a
straightforward answer.
248 See generally NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010).
249 See supra Part II.A.
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